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In the late 1930’s, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, under the direction of the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, constructed Residential Security Maps that graded the housing markets 
of over 200 cities according to a variety of criteria, including some based in harsh racial, ethnic, 
and class prejudice. Explanations for urban development have progressed over the course of the 
twentieth century to reflect not only changing urban conditions but changing ideology and, 
simultaneously, have the capacity to create the conditions that they describe. Burgess’s ecological 
model was influential in the 1930’s and shaped real estate officials’ and policy makers’ notions of 
neighborhood quality and risk. Policymakers’ approach to measuring risk with Residential 
Security Maps has generated much debate. Critiques to Jackson’s traditional argument, that the 
physical maps were used by lenders to redline urban areas, have challenged the feasibility of his 
theory. Using primary government documents from the National Archives and various 
publications, I argue that the FHLBB was an influential voice in the development of neighborhood 
appraisal practices and in the normalization and legitimatization of racialized assessments of 
lending risk. Also, because of the conceptualization of real estate practices, the development of 
similar lending maps, and the sensitivity of the HOLC to local influences and conditions, the 
Residential Security Maps are an appropriate way to assess urban real estate practices in the 
1930’s. I ground the discussion of neighborhood risk onto Pittsburgh’s stratified and segregated 
geography of the 1930’s. I developed a GIS-based framework to assess the impact of neighborhood 
appraisal practices on the social geography of Pittsburgh. I find that neighborhood appraisal had 
lasting and persistent impacts on the social geography of Pittsburgh as more positive conditions 
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were concentrated in green and blue areas and more negative conditions were concentrated in red 
and yellow areas. I discuss the implications of these findings for urban housing, the complicity 
debate, neighborhood development policy, and the prospects for neighborhood equality. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Residential Security Maps it produced 
have generated considerable discussion since they were first described in 1980.1 This conversation 
has grown in recent years as the maps have become more publicly available; the maps have 
provoked the fascination of many urban scholars, activists, and historians. Each Residential 
Security Map colorfully described perceived investment risk in American cities in the 1930’s. 
Those areas considered to be the highest quality investments were colored green, “second grade” 
areas were colored blue, yellow areas were considered to be in ‘definite decline’, and red areas 
were considered “hazardous” to investment and characterized as low class.2 In many cities, the 
maps graded communities of color, the poor, or immigrants particularly harshly and mirrored 
observed patterns of urban disinvestment and lending discrimination.  
A comprehensive review of the HOLC’s history and an assessment of its impact on modern 
conditions is necessary to assess the legacy of this government agency and the role of the federal 
government in perpetuating urban inequality. Many have argued that the physical maps were the 
agent that precipitated divestment and discrimination but this claim doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.3 I 
                                                 
1 Kenneth T. Jackson, “Federal Subsidy and the Suburban Dream: The First Quarter-Century of Government 
Intervention in the Housing Market,” Historical Society of Washington, D.C. 50 (1980): 421–51. 
2 Division of Research and Statistics, “Pittsburgh, PA: Confidential Survey File” (Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 
July 20, 1937), RG 195, National Archives, 1. 
3 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985); Amy E. Hillier, “Redlining and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation,” Journal of Urban 
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argue that the maps were shaped by the ideology of real estate professionals in both the federal 
government and private industry. The government normalized, legitimatized, and endorsed 
approaches to investment and insurance that were, among many prejudices, segregationist. The 
Residential Security Maps were constructed by the same ideology as neighborhood appraisal 
techniques; this ideology, embraced by both public and private officials, led to disinvestment from 
the urban core.4 In Pittsburgh, investment practices buttressed the stark disparities in housing 
quality that already existed and calcified the stratification of neighborhoods. The persistence of 
these disparities is measurable in variables over time and reflects a city that is divided, 
geographically, along historic patterns of inequality. The review of the HOLC’s legacy in shaping 
the modern geography of Pittsburgh illustrates the contribution of historic, uneven investment to 
modern disparities. 
The City Survey Program, the effort within the HOLC that created the maps, represents an 
attempt to rationalize the dynamic growth and decline occurring in industrialized cities at the time. 
The conceptual framework motivated the actions of planners, developers, and the government and 
was largely a reaction to contemporary urban conditions. Urban growth was once believed to 
follow a ‘natural ecology’ that supported a ring of constant urban growth on the periphery with the 
cost of steady decay near the core. This model inspired a cultural perspective of urban conditions 
among urban policy makers who used common rhetoric to describe the “life cycle” of 
neighborhoods, the downward filtration of housing through a social hierarchy, and the threat of 
“infiltrating” lower classes. The ecological model of urban growth informed the perspective of 
policy makers and real estate actors and, in some ways, created the conditions it envisioned. 
                                                 
History 29, no. 4, (2003), 394-420; Amy E. Hillier, "Who Received Loans? Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
Lending and Discrimination in Philadelphia in the 1930s," Journal of Planning History 2, no. 1 (2003), 3-24.  
4 Paul E. Stark, “Neighborhood Protection,” National Real Estate Journal 38, no. 3 (1937), 25. 
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Subsequent theories built upon the ecological model to match the changing conditions of their time 
but simultaneously built urban conditions in their likeness. Once urban centers began to see some 
renewal, theorists considered development to be tied to return of either the wealthy (gentrification) 
or of capital (the rent gap). Each subsequent explanation of urban conditions was tied to the 
changes evident in contemporary urban spaces. By the end of the twentieth century, a political 
economy approach had emerged that regarded development as driven by not just capital in the 
present but the social history of that space and its historic relationship to capital. These theorists 
focused on the demographic and cultural constituencies of an area and understood historical policy 
interventions, such as the Residential Security Maps, to have developed the social context of 
spaces and the even geographies of development in urban areas.  
Conventional research argues that the HOLC produced maps codifying and reinforcing 
disinvestment from areas of the city, particularly African American neighborhoods, and was a 
concrete example of the federal government’s complicity in racialized housing markets.5 Recent 
research has challenged this presumption by reassessing the HOLC and their Residential Security 
Maps’ role—finding less discriminatory lending patterns than alleged and less influential, barely-
circulated maps. Yet, observed patterns of disinvestment still align with the labels and grades of 
the Residential Security Maps. The HOLC and Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) were 
active participants in a public conversation with real estate officials that standardized and 
proliferated neighborhood appraisal practices; a number of large risk-mapping projects have been 
archived and each followed the same mapping conventions suggesting a common geographic 
aesthetic to mapping risk. I will show that local experts held significant power in constructing the 
                                                 
5 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier; Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998).; Kevin Fox Gotham, “Racialization and the State: The Housing Act of 1934 and the 
Creation of the Federal Housing Administration,” Sociological Perspectives 43, no. 2 (2000): 291–317. 
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Residential Security Maps and each map was attuned to the local conditions of that city and 
codified the attitudes of local appraisers and local conditions; thus, while they are not the instigator 
of the real estate industry’s behavior, they are an apt representation and artifact by which to 
evaluate the impact of those behaviors and perceptions. 
Using the Residential Security Map for Pittsburgh, I developed a Geographic Information 
System (GIS)-based framework to assess the association between the 1937 Residential Security 
Map and Pittsburgh’s modern social geography. The Residential Security Map was digitized, 
aligned with a geographic projection, and reconstructed into a shapefile. The referenced map was 
then intersected with census tracts. First, the map was intersected with the 1940 census tracts to 
better describe the variation in conditions and demographics between grades. Population weights 
were used to most effectively associate census counts with the overlapping Residential Security 
Map. Second, the map was intersected with the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) which 
standardized census tracts from 1970 to 2000. The NCDB helps identify those tracts that were 
persistently at the fringe of the distribution for a variety of variables. These flagged tracts were 
counted by their historic security grade and evaluated for independence. 
I found that neighborhood characteristics are significantly more likely to occur in accord 
with their historic redlining status: tracts that were negatively graded retained negative effects 
while those that were positively graded maintained their privileged status. Immigrants and, 
particularly, people of color were disproportionately likely to live in areas graded either red or 
yellow. Both communities were segregated into some areas of the city but African Americans were 
restricted to a much smaller portion of neighborhoods. Home quality, home ownership, and home 
value increased as the grade improved; occupancy rates, crowding, and density decreased as the 
grade improved. The analysis shows a sharp resemblance between the historic grade and the 
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persistence of modern conditions. Tracts with a persistent and relatively extreme prevalence of 
people of color or people in poverty were both overwhelmingly more common in red and yellow 
areas while tracts with the consistently highest average incomes were overwhelmingly located in 
green and blue areas. Red and yellow areas also experienced greater, more sustained population 
loss. Tracts with persistent high ownership rates, including for people of color, and high average 
home value were far more likely to be located in green or blue areas. Red and yellow areas held 
all the tracts with persistently low occupancy rates. Housing built before 1940 was far more likely 
to be demolished, constituted a greater portion of the housing stock, and was more likely to be 
rented in red and yellow areas than green and blue ones. My analysis indicates that past social 
policies can have historic and consequential geographic effects. Moreover, prejudice and 
differences in power mean that the persisting effects of uneven investment continue to be 
experienced by the city’s disadvantaged communities. 
 The association between the Residential Security Map and Pittsburgh’s modern geography 
is not coincidence. The significant association, paired with the FHLBB’s endorsement of 
neighborhood appraisal and their publishing of the methodology for the security maps, suggests 
that the FHLBB and HOLC influenced the enduring stratification of Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods. 
I argue the federal government had, at least some, complicity in segregation. The association also 
reflects the capacity of theory, particularly models, to produce the spaces that they describe. Some 
theories of urban development are insufficient for describing the particular permanence of 
Pittsburgh’s social geography. However, political economy approaches complement the 
development of neighborhood concepts and the persistence of compounding geographic legacies. 
The persistence also reflects an ineffectiveness of government interventions, in the succeeding six 
decades, to alter the geography of disparity that defined Pittsburgh. Amid the neoliberal political 
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trends that have gripped the United States and a gentrifying back-to-the-city movement, the 
prospects for a more equal social geography are not optimistic.6 
In this thesis, I establish and discuss the conceptual approaches to urban development and 
neighborhood appraisal, ground these concepts in Pittsburgh’s segregated geography of the 1930’s 
and assess the impact of these concepts on that geography through time, and finally discuss the 
implications of my findings for the conceptualization of neighborhood appraisal and urban 
development. In Chapters 2 and 3, I establish the ability of geographic models, theoretical or 
practical, to have place making effects on urban space. First, I explore how twentieth century 
explanations of urban development conceptualized urban conditions and growth, paying particular 
attention to the capacity of these models to create the conditions they described. Where in Chapter 
2 I engage with the larger more theoretical notions of neighborhood change, in Chapter 3 I focus 
the discussion towards the application of policy and ideology to specific urban spaces. I discuss 
how the construction of the Residential Security Maps and the conceptualization of neighborhood 
appraisal developed from the government’s engagement with and normalization of prejudiced 
notions of risk and value. I also argue that the Residential Security Maps are an apt vehicle to 
explore the real estate industry’s behavior at a specific time and place. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I 
ground the conceptualization of real estate practices in Pittsburgh’s social geography to assess how 
real estate shaped that geography through time. To begin, I describe the highly stratified and 
segregated geography of Pittsburgh during the 1930’s and discuss the implications of these patterns 
for shaping real estate ideology. Next, I describe the development of a GIS-based framework to 
evaluate the impact of neighborhood appraisal practices on Pittsburgh’s uneven geography of 
                                                 
6 David S Hyra, “Conceptualizing the New Urban Renewal: Comparing the Past to the Present,” Urban Affairs 
Review 48, no. 4 (2012) : 498–527. 
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development. Then I highlight the findings of this research, particularly, the significant association 
between persistent neighborhood characteristics and the historic redlining status of the community. 
In Chapter 7, I discuss the implications of an entrenched social geography for the legacy of the 
HOLC, the complicity debate, theories of urban development, and government policy. Finally, I 
summarize some of the key elements of this research and discuss the prospects for easing the 
geography of disparity that has defined Pittsburgh for six decades in Chapter 8. 
 The conceptualization of urban growth, intertwined with prejudiced ideologies about race 
and value, motivated the policy approaches and actions of both the government and private 
industry and thus produced those conceptions on actual urban geographies. The federal 
government—through the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Housing 
Administration—normalized and professionalized neighborhood appraisal techniques that 
operationalized the conceptions of urban growth as government policy and thus rationalized 
uneven investment in American cities. Pittsburgh’s historic patterns of uneven investment 
contribute to modern disparities in urban space; the contemporary social geography aligns 
significantly with the stratified geography captured in the 1937 Residential Security Map of the 
city.  
 8 
2.0  TWENTIETH CENTURY EXPLANATIONS OF URBAN GROWTH 
The twentieth century witnessed rapid, evolving development, and decline in central cities as mass 
migrations, technological development, and economic changes reorganized urban space. 
Fundamental to the discussion of neighborhood disparities, investment, and segregation are 
evolving notions of what drives neighborhood change and the nature of communities that have 
informed both government policy and the actions of private industry; ideology has shaped 
approaches to urban problems over the course of the twentieth century. Urban theorists developed 
conceptual models that described the forces that drove change. From these conceptual models, 
institutions developed policy models that transformed space by imposing the conceptual models 
onto the city. This created a propensity for the models to construct, via policy, the very realities 
that they described. 
In the 1920’s and 1930’s, many American cities, including Pittsburgh, were mature 
industrial centers bursting at the seams from industrial expansion and massive migration. In this 
period, Eastern and Southern Europeans and African Americans poured into northern industrial 
centers in search of economic opportunity. Many of these new migrants settled in ethnic or racial 
communities that were characterized by poor conditions and deteriorating housing stock near 
heavy manufacturing and other industrial uses that provided convenient employment. The 
industrial core was typified by heavy industry, commercial centers, or deteriorating housing stock. 
At the periphery, an abundance of undeveloped land and new transportation technology provided 
an escape from grim urban conditions for those who could afford it. These were the urban 
conditions Ernest Burgess and Robert E. Park were attempting to describe during their initial time 
at the University of Chicago’s School of Sociology. They developed one of the earliest models of 
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neighborhood transition that understood the city as a series of concentric zones (see Figure 1). 
Each zone represented a successive step in urban expansion. At the center of the city was a central 
business district which was perpetually expanding and consuming dilapidated housing from the 
transition zone and redeveloping the land for commercial and manufacturing uses. Communities 
were believed to radiate outward from the menace of industry and with increasing distance came 
Figure 1 Burgess's Ecological Model of Development, The City (1925) 
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increasing community character. At the outer edge of the urban sphere were “high-class 
apartments” and “exclusive ‘restricted’ districts of single family dwellings.”7 The inner rings were 
home to Immigrant and African-American communities. New residential construction took place 
on the periphery and, as communities expanded beyond these units, older units would be filtered 
down through the various social classes. Neighborhoods followed a life cycle that began with new 
construction and occupation by upper economic classes and then deteriorated over time in both 
physical quality and perceived neighborhood character. There were some elements of morality 
attached to the concentric rings. The inner transition zone is typified by “slums,” the “underworld,” 
and “vice.” At the periphery, “bright light” areas seem to cap the expansion of immigrant 
communities.8 It is implied that one’s distance from the urban core is a reflection of moral 
character. While their model was certainly limited, it was an early attempt to make sense of a 
rapidly changing urban environment. 
The ecological model had two fundamental perspectives on urban space: first, housing was 
a commodity that was both readily constructed and naturally declined over time. Second, housing 
filtered down a social hierarchy—organized by race, ethnicity, and class. The quality of the 
housing and the quality of the community were considered to mirror one another. The rhetoric of 
the ecological model is present throughout New Deal housing programs. The FHLBB, the federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), and the real estate industry consistently discuss “life cycles,” 
infiltration, blight, and invasion in their work.  
This perspective continued to inform urban policy in the 1940’s and 1950’s. The 
emergence of a middle class from massive wealth generation after World War II combined with 
                                                 
7 Ernest W. Burgess, “The Growth of the City,” in The City, ed. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess (Chcago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1925), 48-62. 
8 Burgess, “The Growth of the City,” 55. 
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the government’s subsidization of suburbanization allowed many—but not all—communities to 
escape the deteriorating urban core. Government money was also spent on large urban renewal 
projects that razed deteriorating communities, replacing some of them with urban highways to 
ferry growing numbers of suburban commuters into the Central Business District and others with 
public housing developments. This dynamic, stripped of some nuance, replicated an ideology that 
relegated poorer communities to the declining urban core while expecting those who could afford 
to move to the periphery, to do so. In Pittsburgh, sprawl stretched outwards as the construction of 
I-79, I-279, I-76, and I-376 allowed suburban communities to easily access the city. Large urban 
renewal projects in the Hill District, Allegheny Center, and East Liberty displaced thousands of 
residents to make way for malls, parks, and arenas. In Pittsburgh, like almost every American city, 
government investment, motivated by a particular ideology about development, reshaped portions 
of the physical landscape. 
By the 1960’s, there was some renewed interest in urban communities. Great Society 
programs prioritized some urban investment in transportation and housing and elevated Housing 
and Urban Development to a cabinet level position.9 While American cities continued to 
suburbanize, some cities internationally began to see a resurgence in urban communities. London, 
for instance, experienced renewed market interest in a few neighborhoods. The phrase 
‘gentrification’ was coined by Ruth Glass in 1964 to explain the resurgence of home values in 
certain London neighborhoods. Glass observed an “invasion” of middle and upper-middle class 
residents into formerly poor neighborhoods forcing previous residents to leave because of the 
inflation in home costs; when the gentry came, the prices rose. Such a phenomenon did not exist 
at the time Burgess developed the ecology model. Glass was reacting and describing a novel set 
                                                 
9 John Gardner: Uncommon American (Public Broadcasting Service, 2000). 
 12 
of circumstances and in doing so added a new mechanism to the ecology model. The gentrification 
process which she describes recycles some of the more central urban communities back to a higher 
socio-economic class. Along with the demographic change came a transition in housing structure 
as units were subdivided to meet the growing demand: “the current social status and value of such 
dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to their size, and in any case enormously inflated by 
comparison” to the previous prices, Glass observed.10 She explained the transition of 
neighborhoods as a consequence of poor urban planning policies in the Greater London Plan of 
1944 that failed to account for the growth in population. According to Glass, the growth of 
population led to natural increases in housing demand—people were driving the selective 
renaissance of certain neighborhoods. Glass’s attention to individual behaviors en masse, 
resembled other contemporary, American approaches to systemic urban problems. For instance, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 banned discrimination in housing because of race, color, religion, or 
national origin. Government policy assumed that by preventing individual actions en masse, 
systemic problems would be alleviated.  
By the 1970’s, deindustrialization had begun to erode the heavy manufacturing, industrial 
base that had supported many urban economies, including Pittsburgh’s. The American economy 
was transitioning towards a service economy with strong growth in finance and insurance. 
Approaches to urban spaces became driven by neoliberal notions of shrinking government services 
and regulation and allowing the market to determine development instead. David Ley argued in 
1980 that growth in the central city was driven first by the transformation of the economy away 
from blue-collar work and towards white-collar work. Secondly, an increased “politicization” of 
                                                 
10 Ruth Glass, “Aspects of Change” in The Gentrification Debates: A Reader, ed. Japonica Brown-Saracino (New 
York: Routledge, 2010), 22. 
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interest groups was “challenging the formerly firm hold of the business lobby on political decision 
making” advancing “public interest” in opposition to “economic efficiency.”11 Finally, a 
developing aesthetic philosophy among white-collar workers was challenging nineteenth century 
urban planning values of “capital and labor.”12 These three transformations—an economic shift 
that inspired political and cultural shifts—are understood to have driven the urban resurgence in 
central business districts in post-industrial cities and particularly, for Ley, in Vancouver. Ley’s 
interpretation of urban reinvestment parallels Ruth Glass’s argument about gentrification: people 
are responsible for economic change in urban neighborhoods and their decisions, en masse, can 
uplift (or undermine) entire physical spaces.  
By placing the onus of gentrification on the cumulative decisions of consumers, 
neighborhood change theorists neglected many of the agents that hold substantial power in 
development including governments and real estate financiers. In 1979, Neil Smith argued that 
capital investment spurred the movement of people. There was a cycle of investment where initial 
construction in urban spaces and the price included both the value of the structure itself but also 
the improvement in value of the land itself (the ground rent). Maintaining the value of a property 
is dependent on regular and substantial investment, in the form of regular minor and major repairs, 
but also on community-level patterns of investment. An exodus of capital from the community 
will occur unless stability is maintained across the neighborhood through regular investments. Yet, 
because investments have already raised the minimum value of ground rents, there is little 
incentive to maintain regular investments once minimum ground rents are relatively lower in other 
areas (and thus the return on investment is higher). There is a constant tension between old 
                                                 
11 David Ley, "Liberal Ideology and the Postindustrial City," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
70, no. 2 (1980): 241. 
12 Ley, “Liberal Ideology and the Postindustrial City,” 243. 
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investments that support the creation of new investments and the relative success of the newer 
investment that outcompetes and eventually destroys the original investment. Urban 
neighborhoods declined, according to this model, because of the higher returns for capital 
investment in suburban communities—not because of the tastes of consumers.13 Gentrification, 
similarly, occurs because of a rent gap that develops once the potential value of deteriorated 
communities exceeds the actual ground rents “capitalized under the present land use.”14 The 
conditions necessary for this process to work existed in the latter decades of the twentieth century. 
In some ways, the ecology model that Burgess developed explained a similar pattern. What existed 
in Burgess’s time—a cheaper and readily available source of green fields at the periphery—had 
been largely exhausted by the time Smith observed a shift in capital towards the urban core.  
Smith’s article on neighborhood development incorporates power and the underlying 
economics that drive investment and preempt or even construct the cumulative decisions of people; 
yet, his work doesn’t effectively describe the influences, beyond pure financial calculations, that 
prioritize certain communities over others—why one undercapitalized area develops relative to 
another. Smith’s Marxist perspective on urban development paralleled, ironically, the neoliberal 
political movement as ideology, critical or political, deferred to the movement of capital as the 
ultimate force in development. Neoliberals celebrated the movement of capital and the reduction 
of government intervention that would provide less friction on the flow of capital. Urban 
development policy increasingly looked to capital to reorganize urban geography and encouraged 
                                                 
13 Neil Smith, "Toward a Theory of Gentrification: a Back to the City Movement by Capital, not People," Journal of 
the American Planning Association 45, no. 4 (1979): 542-544. 
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investment by lowering the rent gap of redevelopment projects through tax incentives such as New 
Markets Tax Credits or Tax Increment Financing.15  
However, uneven development persisted and it became clear that neighborhoods do not 
develop purely because of rent gaps; they develop or decline as various political forces, historical 
contexts, constituencies, and wider social inequalities interact with—and direct the flow of—
capital. In 1987, David Bartelt et al, built upon Smith’s attention to capital and advanced a political 
economy perspective by blending three approaches to urban structure and development in their 
article, “Islands in the Stream.” The first leg of this perspective understands the pattern of 
development to reflect the investment decisions of political and economic classes. Political units, 
ranging from a city block to an entire metropolitan area, are in constant competition over a limited 
supply of financial growth such that geographic maps should be interpreted as not only “legal, 
political, or topographical features, but as a mosaic of competing land interests.”16 The second 
approach focusses on the inequality of wages between economic classes and racial groups. When 
groups have distinct financial power, they also have distinct consumption patterns; segregation 
exacerbates these divisions and “the city becomes a social arena within which the conflicts over 
the consumption of land are played out.”17 Finally, the third approach evaluates how the 
organization of the economy produces uneven development across space. Because investment is a 
sunk cost until it generates a return and cannot increase that return without further investment, the 
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funds will be directed towards the development of other locations that are not already developed 
(essential where the rent gap is lower) and thus the original investment’s capacity is constrained. 
These new locations, built to maximize returns, then outcompete the original investments which, 
in turn, decline precipitously.18 This approach mirrors the rent-gap process described by Smith and 
describes the tension between urban neighborhoods and the suburbs. A political economy 
perspective of development emphasizes historical context, intercommunity conflict, and the 
organization of capital to explain development.  
The spatial organization of housing, like the spatial organization of the economy, reflects 
the historic contexts, political conflicts, community competition and power, and previous 
investment. Housing’s “physical permanence provides markers of the eras past and, when 
combined with the social, economic, and political history of a locale, provides a unique point of 
origin for the historical examination of communities” according to David Bartelt’s 1993 piece on 
“Housing the ‘Underclass.’”19 Modern housing patterns reflect the political economy of a 
neighborhood, the larger urban area, and the historic position of that community. Housing serves 
as both an initial investment and a source of repeated investments as it moves along a chain of 
owners. Mortgages, since the New Deal, are long term investments and the wisdom of the 
investment depends either on the ability of debtors to repay or, more often, on the ability of the 
house to sell and repay the remainder of the debt. If a home were to significantly depreciate in 
value, the profit from interest and perhaps the initial investment itself would be lost. Theoretically, 
if banks were to only sell mortgages for homes that would be assured to appreciate and never sell 
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mortgages for homes that would depreciate than capital would grow without disruption. Bartelt 
argues that uneven development, wrought by historic government programs, leaves legacies that 
continue to shape urban space; he highlights the Residential Security Maps as an attempt by 
regulators to protect investment by navigating lenders away from depreciating communities and 
towards growing ones with profound implications for communities’ futures. 
Ideology, explanations for urban change, and government policy have an interwoven, and 
generative relationship that shape urban conditions. Often, ideology and models of urban growth 
produce the urban conditions which they had described because they conceptualize and motivate 
the actions of policy makers and other influential—but nongovernmental—urban actors. 
Economic and political geography have the capacity to produce the reality that they conceptualize: 
geographic claims and models are performative.20 The ecological model had a large following and 
conceptual imprint among urban actors in the 1930’s from government bureaucrats to mortgage 
lenders. The Residential Security Maps, a series of localized policy models influenced by the 
ecological model, were an application of the conceptualization of mortgage risk by both the federal 
government and private industry that has been legitimatized, normalized, and proliferated 
neighborhood appraisal techniques; this connection is discussed in Chapter 3. In Pittsburgh, 
neighborhood appraisal techniques, fraught with racial and class prejudice, were formed upon a 
largely divided social geography with wide disparities in housing quality in the 1930’s. This 
geography is described in Chapter 4. My analysis shows that Pittsburgh’s social geography is 
strongly associated with the Residential Security Map even decades after the map was constructed. 
While the physical map did not define or enforce the geography, the conceptual foundation of the 
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map did: in Pittsburgh, neighborhood appraisal produced the conditions that it described; this 




3.0  THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORPORATION 
Theorists’ attempts to explain urban development influenced the efforts of policy makers to affect 
change in urban communities. Policy interventions are informed by the prevailing ideologies of 
experts and theorists. The Residential Security maps and neighborhood appraisal techniques that 
developed in the 1930’s were influenced by Burgess’s descriptions of urban growth; these 
mechanisms operationalized the ecology model into a rationale intended to guide investment 
practices. Those practices also had direct impacts on urban communities. Decades later, Bartelt 
and other theorists argued that contemporary patterns of investment are driven by the historic and 
social construction of space and pointed to programs, like the Residential Security Maps, that 
guided the investment of capital and led to legacies and disparities. The theoretical explanations 
of development add critical context to the subsequent history of the HOLC, the Residential 
Security Maps and their impact on urban space. Upon this ideological base, private and 
government real estate experts developed a conceptualization of neighborhood appraisal that was 
heavily prejudiced against minority and poor communites. 
This history of the HOLC was developed from numerous published research articles and 
relied heavily on a range of primary government documents, including those housed at the National 
Archives in College Park, MD, government published journals such as the Insured Mortgage 
Portfolio and the Federal Home Loan Bank Review, and various security maps developed by both 
governmental and private institutions.  
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3.1 THE HOLC AS A LENDING INSTITUTION 
The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was created in June 1933, by the Home Owners’ Loan Act, 
to stabilize the freefall of the American housing market during the Great Depression. HOLC was 
designed to provide relief to both home owners and their creditors.21 Created under the supervision 
of the Federal Housing Loan Bank Board, The HOLC’s explicit purpose was to exchange 
government bonds to creditors, primarily savings and loans, for delinquent mortgages giving the 
lenders the liquid capital they so desperately needed. The creditor and the homeowner would then 
enter into a new low-interest 15 year amortized mortgage allowing the homeowner a secure and 
manageable route out of foreclosure and towards full ownership.22 To qualify for assistance from 
the HOLC, a home had to already be in foreclosure and the loan could not exceed $14,000 (in 1933 
dollars) or exceed 80% of the appraised value of the house.23 Once homeowners received the loan, 
funds were restricted from being put towards ownership-related expenses such as taxes, incidental 
costs and, significantly, maintenance.24 Some 40% of those eligible for HOLC aid applied and 
between 1933 and 1935 the HOLC made more than a million loans and refinanced some 20% of 
non-farmer homes in the country.25   
It is important to note that while the HOLC’s function stabilized the financial side of the 
housing market by providing lenders liquid capital and protecting the investment of homeowners 
by preventing foreclosure, the HOLC did not serve the infrastructure side of the housing market 
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and no relief was available from the HOLC towards maintenance, renovation or construction for 
homeowners already struggling to pay mortgage costs amid high unemployment and a 
Depression—while financial markets were insured, the physical conditions of homes and 
communities were not.26 The entire apparatus that the HOLC was a member of—the FHLBB—
was created to maintain the financial markets surrounding housing not maintain housing or 
neighborhoods themselves.27  
Once HOLC’s two year lending period expired in 1935, the agency transitioned into the 
role of administering a tremendous portfolio of mortgages, helping borrowers towards solvency, 
and acquiring nearly 200,000 foreclosed properties.28 In 1935, the FHLBB created, within HOLC, 
a Mortgagee Rehabilitation Unit tasked with surveying local real estate conditions, with 
determining the condition of the local mortgage market, and with developing detailed studies of 
cities to both inform the FHLBB’s work and develop solutions for dysfunctional lending 
practices.29 In fulfilling their tasks, the Mortgagee Rehabilitation Unit surveyed lenders, 
conditions, and markets in over 200 cities across the country—a process named the City Survey 
Program. For each city, the program produced a public summary file and a confidential survey file 
which included a Residential Security Map. 
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3.2 THE RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MAPS  
The HOLC’s administrators instructed the appraisers in each city to collect rigorous and systematic 
data for the maps. The instructions for data collection were included on the back side of Area 
Description Sheets sent to each city. These sheets required HOLC appraisers to work in 
conjunction with local lenders and real estate agents to collect data for individual neighborhoods 
within each city. Appraisers paid particular attention to the quality and condition of the homes, the 
demographic situation of the community such as income and occupations, “the areas ability to 
attract and maintain mortgage investment flows,” any aspects of the neighborhood that would 
improve or harm the “long-term value of the homes,” “the race and ethnicity” of the community, 
and “if zoning provisions and/or racially restrictive covenants to “protect” the character of the 
community were in place.”30 Based upon the data collected, maps would be drawn to outline the 
perceived quality of the housing submarket and “graphically represent the trend in desirability in 
neighborhoods.”31 Each submarket would receive a color coded grade based upon its perceived 
value and risk ranging from green (“best”) to blue (“very good”) to yellow (“definitely declining”) 
to red (“hazardous”). For example, the 1937 map of Pittsburgh is included as Figure 2.32 
HOLC described the qualitative differences between the grades in the confidential survey 
file. First grade areas represented “hot spots” and were developing, homogenous, well-planned 
sections of the city and are “synonymous with areas where good mortgage lenders with the 
available funds are willing to make maximum loans.”33 Second grade areas were already fully 
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developed but otherwise similar to first grade areas. According to the HOLC’s survey file for 
Pittsburgh (which was written in 1937), “they are like a 1935 automobile—still good, but not what 
the people are buying today who can afford a new one.”34 Third grade areas are those that have 
reached a “transition” period: they are characterized by age or obsolescence, have expiring 
restrictive covenants, “infiltration of a lower grade population,” insufficient utilities, poor 
maintenance of homes, or lack homogeneity.35 Fourth grade areas were communities already 
experiencing what was threatening to occur in third grade areas and were “characterized by 
detrimental influences in a pronounced degree” particularly an “undesirable population.”36
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Figure 2 Residential Security Map for Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1937)
 25 
Appraisers for the security maps also graded the housing markets according to strict criteria 
and preference was given to those communities that contained homes matching the FHA’s 
guidelines: homes should be recently constructed, well maintained, high priced, single-family 
homes with modern amenities such as plumbing and heating. But “with housing construction of 
these newest, most amenity rich, and high value homes in scarce supply since the peak of 
construction in 1926, few housing submarkets in the HOLC survey received high ratings.”37 
Another criteria for rating the quality of a neighborhood was the presence of zoning or racially 
restrictive covenants. Absence of restrictive zoning was “considered a distinct negative feature for 
a housing submarket” and such protections were “prerequisites for high HOLC risk grades (“best” 
or “good”).”38 These general observations provide some insight into the preferences present in the 
Residential Security Maps: while the FHLBB makes clear, in the confidential file, that good loans 
could be made in both lower grades, there was a perceived value about the character of a 
neighborhood reflected in the maps’ grading scale clearly biased towards FHA style housing and 
towards all-white communities. 
Several researchers have attempted to recreate a grading rubric to understand how different 
factors were weighted against one another. Using available data contemporaneous to the City 
Survey Program and statistical modeling, researchers are able to estimate the guiding patterns 
behind the grade.  
Amy Hillier attempted to recreate the methodology for the 1935, 1936 and 1937 
Residential Security Maps of Philadelphia in her 2005 article, “Residential Security Maps and 
Neighborhood Appraisals in Philadelphia.” Hillier found that for the final 1937 map, poorer 
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housing conditions were good predictors of worse risk grades—particularly value, age, and 
overcrowding. All of these housing conditions had greater influence than race or immigrant 
presence although both of those were significant indicators of lower risk grades as well. The 
influence of race indicates that racial prejudices, rampant throughout the real estate industry, were 
active in the HOLC as well and “constituted a federal endorsement of racially based appraisal 
standards.”39  
The Residential Security Maps for Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were analyzed by Kristen 
Crossney and David Bartelt in their 2005 article “Residential Security, Risk, and Race.” 
Comparing regressions for each of the maps revealed clear differences in factors determining risk 
between the cities, reflecting the local nuances embodied in each map. In both cities housing values 
and owner occupancy affected the grade significantly and the percentage of African Americans 
and immigrant whites were also moderately significant. In Philadelphia, the age of housing was a 
very significant factor but insignificant in Pittsburgh; the grades in Pittsburgh were affected by the 
number of units in a house while in Philadelphia that was not a factor.40 This analysis confirms the 
pattern established in Hillier’s paper and reveals local influences changed the grading rubric from 
city to city suggesting each map is a localized portrait of the real estate environment in an 
individual city. 
James Greer examined the correlation between risk grade and neighborhood characteristics 
outlined in the Area Description Sheets for twenty six cities in a 2013 paper, “The Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation and the Residential Security Maps.” Greer found strong positive correlations 
between the risk grade and both the qualitative assessment of mortgage availability and the 
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qualitative assessment of housing quality. Greer also found more moderate but still significant 
negative correlation between the risk grade and the presence of any African Americans or foreign 
born individuals. In a closer examination of Cleveland and St. Louis, Greer found that the presence 
of even a single African American family meant the neighborhood was graded either “definitely 
declining” or “hazardous” and in Chicago every single non-white individual lived in an area zoned 
“hazardous.”41 It is worth noting that many all-white neighborhoods received low grades as well; 
while redlined communities were not totally communities of color, communities of color were 
often totally redlined. 
The HOLC’s appraisers considered the presence of racial or ethnic minorities as a 
significant threat to investment risk. Each of the three assessments of the maps confirmed the 
influence of race and ethnicity in determining the grade. To some extent the maps were as much a 
grade of the people—from the perspective of the HOLC—as they were a grade of market 
conditions. Given the racial bias pervasive in real estate industry, it is likely that market activity 
itself was a grade of the people in a community. Real estate officials throughout the industry were 
both vocal in their suspicion of racial and ethnic minorities and active in efforts to restrict them 
from certain communities; it is likely that not only was the HOLC incorporating private industry 
standards but employed many real estate experts who had similar mindset.42 Each of the three 
articles reveal some variance between maps for different cities and even for different years. The 
extent to which each map is a localized portrait of lender’s beliefs and practices, in that space, at 
that time, makes the maps a reflection of risk assessment techniques and the racialization of 
housing and lending policies.  
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3.3 TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE: HOLC AS SEGREGATOR 
The Residential Security Maps and the HOLC have, for several decades, been identified as an 
influential architect of mortgage discrimination, segregation and urban housing decay. One of the 
earlier and oft cited criticisms of the Residential Security Maps was laid out in Kenneth Jackson’s 
Crabgrass Frontier (1985) when he said the “Home Owners’ Loan Corporation initiated the 
practice of ‘red lining.’”43 Jackson’s larger argument asserted that the federal government was 
complicit in racial discrimination and the departure of whites from cities for the suburbs. To 
Jackson, the Residential Security Maps and the area descriptions written by HOLC appraisers were 
a dramatic and glaring artifact of not only the federal government’s racial prejudices but its active 
participation in a public-private partnership that denied urban communities, particularly 
communities of color, access to financial services. For instance, Jackson cites a FHLBB survey of 
banks and saving-and-loan associations where the responses from Newark, NJ seemingly refer to 
the Residential Security Maps. When asked what the most desirable lending areas are, responses 
ranged from “A and B” to “Blue” to “FHA Only” and when asked where loans will not be made, 
responses ranged from “Red and most yellow” to “C and D.” The responses led Jackson to 
conclude “obviously, private banking institutions were privy to and influenced by the 
government’s Residential Security Maps.”44 Jackson also asserts that the HOLC influenced the 
FHA’s appraisal methods and their insurance habits because many of the few areas given high 
ratings by the HOLC were on cities’ periphery if not in the suburbs and FHA insurance was 
overwhelmingly concentrated away from urban centers. 
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Jackson’s argument that the Residential Security Maps represent a government 
institutionalization of redlining and discrimination have been repeatedly cited by other urban 
researchers. In American Apartheid (1993), Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton built upon 
Jackson’s argument and place the HOLC and the Residential Security Maps within the broader 
context of an extreme degree of racial segregation sanctioned by the government through housing 
policy. They write, the government “bureaucratized [racial standards] and applied them on an 
exceptional scale. It lent the power, prestige and support of the federal government to the 
systematic practice of racial discrimination in housing.”45 None of the authors attribute the federal 
government with originally racializing housing in the United States but rather assert that the 
government embraced the prejudices and practices of industry. They contend the maps reflect the 
government’s sanction of those prejudices and practices. They further assert that the government, 
via the maps, influenced and spread redlining to the real estate industry.  
In the 2000 article, “Racialization and the State,” Kevin Fox Gotham further built upon 
Kenneth Jackson’s original argument about the HOLC and redlining. The article agrees with 
Massey and Denton and asserts that the “effect of the mass application of the HOLC’s appraisal 
rating system was to systematically devalue racially mixed and predominantly minority 
neighborhoods, thereby precluding private investment.” Gotham argues that the FHA racialized 
housing policy but does point to another influence of the HOLC on the FHA:  
“built-in clientele of the FHLB and HOLC supplied the FHA with a trained and 
competent staff of state managers and officials from the real estate and lending 
industries to guide policy making, establish appraisal guidelines, and set national 
standards for lending and mortgage insurance.”46  
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Gotham focusses on the FHA’s policies as agents of racializing housing markets but cites 
the HOLC as the FHA’s institutional and ideological precedent. These authors advanced the 
traditional narrative that the federal government was complicit in both segregation and the creation 
of the suburbs. The narrative had a number of examples of government complicity but the HOLC 
maps were a visually-striking example of systematic government prejudice. Much of the narrative 
surrounding the HOLC originated in Kenneth Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier, which made 
reference to the maps but did not establish definitive proof that the alleged conspiracy took place.  
3.4 CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT 
Recent research has challenged some of the fundamental tenets of the traditional narrative alleging 
the federal government’s complicity in reinforcing segregation, particularly the role and influence 
of the HOLC, the traditional narrative’s cornerstone. The first general questioning of the federal 
government’s complicity overall, “Federal Policy and Postwar Urban Decline: A Case of 
Government Complicity?,” was written by Robert Beauregard in 2001. Beauregard cites Jackson’s 
Crabgrass Frontier as the source for this traditional narrative. His criticism hinges on four main 
points: first, that the population growth in suburbs is not matched by decline in the cities; second, 
the timeline of government policies does not align with the presumed consequences; third, the 
narrative doesn’t account for broader geographic migration to the southwest; and fourth, it overly 
emphasizes the influence of the federal government. Beauregard did not disprove the traditional 
narrative so much as he challenged its proponents to respond to some fundamental assumptions in 
the narrative.  
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Inspired by the generalized challenge to the traditional narrative, later research has 
critically reexamined the HOLC’s role. Particularly influential are Amy Hillier’s four articles 
published between 2003 and 2005. In one of her 2003 articles, “Redlining and the Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation,” Hillier rebuts the assertion that the HOLC initiated or spread redlining by 
reexamining the assumption that the maps were accessible or even distributed to lending 
institutions. Her review of FHLBB records found no support for this assumption and found that 
the maps were kept confidential and were not generally distributed until Kenneth Jackson 
unearthed them in 1980. She noted that researchers have not discovered these maps anywhere but 
the archives, yet, if the maps had been widely distributed among lenders, than HOLC’s maps 
should have been found at various Savings and Loans’ or Appraisers’ offices.47  
In another article published in 2003, “Who Received Loans? Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation Lending and Discrimination in Philadelphia in the 1930’s,” Hillier examines HOLC’s 
lending practices and found that the HOLC did not discriminate by whom or where it lent. Hillier 
focused on lending in Philadelphia and found HOLC lent heavily in areas it would later consider 
‘Hazardous’ and cites authors who found similar patterns in Miami, Chicago, Memphis, and 
Newark. 48 The HOLC also assisted Jewish, foreign-born, and Black Philadelphians 
proportionately to their presence in the city. 49Also salient is her critique of the timeline required 
for the HOLC as segregator narrative: the HOLC had stopped lending by the time it began its 
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mapping program so it would have been impossible for HOLC loan agents to be influenced by the 
Residential Security Maps.50  
Hiller established practical deficiencies in the traditional narrative. Crossney and Bartelt 
built on Hillier’s work in their 2005 article, “The Legacy of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.” 
They examined the relationship between the prevalence of mortgages reported in the 1940 census 
and both HOLC grade and a number of census tract characteristics in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. 
Their regression model found dissimilar patterns between the two cities and between different 
types of lenders and a “complex interrelationship between HOLC appraisal grades, differential 
access to mortgages, the criteria used by different types of lenders, and the ethnic and minority 
composition of neighborhoods.”51 The article complicates the traditional narrative’s assumption 
that HOLC’s judgements were directly mirrored by private institutions behavior.  
Much of the traditional narrative’s treatment of the Residential Security Maps, and the way 
the maps have been understood is insufficient, given Hillier’s challenges to the timeline and 
mechanisms of HOLC’s influence. Hillier’s research established that the physical Residential 
Security Maps were not the direct cause of segregation nor were they a reference that inspired the 
disinvestment from urban, minority communities. Crossney and Bartelt’s article added more 
complexity to the traditional discussion of HOLC and the lending industry. Considering the 
critiques that have been made of the traditional narrative, it is necessary to revisit the capacity of 
HOLC to have influenced the behavior of lenders and the significance of the Residential Security 
Maps. 
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Despite the criticism of the traditional narrative, the Residential Security Maps are still an 
excellent source of information about real estate practices and housing markets in specific cities at 
the time they were drawn. I argue that the Residential Security Maps are an appropriate artifact by 
which to assess the real estate practices in a given city. First, the Residential Security Maps were 
constructed amid a public conversation between the government and private industry about how 
to appraise neighborhood risk and the FHLBB published the methodology for developing the maps 
themselves. Second, the Residential Security Maps are similar to other archived projects in style, 
grading content, and mapping conventions suggesting that mapping programs did occur across the 
country; common stylistic criteria about how develop a map existed in the zeitgeist. Third, the 
HOLC was heavily influenced by local practices and the maps thus were a localized reflection of 
real estate appraisal and conceptual redlining among lenders within that specific city. Finally, I 
argue that the Residential Security Map can be used to estimate lenders habits in a city because of 
the particular context in which the maps were constructed. 
3.5 TREND TOWARDS APPRAISING NEIGHBORHOOD RISK 
National professional thinkers, at this time, believed that best practices—conceived at the national 
level—should be implemented in local contexts to align lower levels of government with modern, 
‘scientific’ ideologies. In the 1920’s, Progressives trained in emerging social sciences, attempted 
to consolidate Allegheny County’s municipalities to modernize local governments towards the 
national ideologies.52 Similarly, FHLBB officials, elevated by their position in the government, 
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understood themselves as professional role models for a struggling real estate industry and as 
educators to local lenders about modern developments and ideal practice. By the time, HOLC 
transitioned towards the City Survey Program, they had become the largest holder of mortgages in 
the nation.53 The FHLBB felt obligated to share HOLC’s experience as education for other 
lenders.54 Further, the FHLBB viewed itself as a leader of the real estate industry towards modern, 
‘scientific’ approaches to lending. The governor of the FHLBB, James Twohy, said in a speech to 
mortgage lenders that the FHLBB was meant “not to follow but to lead the industry.”55 The 
mindset of government officials as on the forefront of modern ideology and thus educators of the 
real estate industry explains the FHLBB’s purpose for sharing neighborhood appraisal techniques 
in the ensuing discussion.  
 The FHLBB’s impression of itself as a leader and its assessment of the real estate industry’s 
particular weaknesses informed the development of the Residential Security Maps. In October 
1934, John H. Fahey, the Chairman of the FHLBB, published a vision for the federal government’s 
emerging role in the housing market. Recently created New Deal agencies, mostly under the 
auspice of the FHLBB, were intended to reorganize the industry to eliminate inefficiencies that 
had jeopardized the financial solvency of American homeowners, mortgage lenders, and even the 
economy overall. Fahey describes a number of inadequacies that plagued private industry at the 
time—ranging from the poor organization of financial institutions to poor lending practices based 
upon poor information and appraisal—but could be fixed through federal intervention and 
regulation. Under the direction of Chairman Fahey, the FHLBB would, among other steps, help 
                                                 
53 Harriss, History and Policies, 12. 
54 “Minutes of the HOLC and FHLBB,” August 27, 1935, RG 195, Entry 14, National Archives. 
55 James Twohy, “Speech before the New York State League of Savings and Loan Associations,” (National 
Archives, RG 195, Entry 1, Box 13), December 14, 1939. 
 35 
establish “uniform standards of operation for all home-financing institutions” and “improve the 
quality of appraisals.”56 The FHLBB’s conception of itself as a solution to the particular problems 
of the real estate industry precipitated its advancement and publishing of neighborhood appraisal 
standards as a guide for industry practice. The HOLC had been mandated to rescue hundreds of 
thousands of loans that were in default and from its experience it was clear that the national home-
financing apparatus was in crisis.57 The FHLBB and the HOLC adopted what were understood to 
be the most advanced and scientific approaches to appraisal at the time. The context that these 
agencies were working within and motivation to correct a system in shambles perhaps made the 
development of the Residential Security Maps inevitable; they were a manifestation of the 
particular ideological context of urban growth, racial hierarchies, and lending practices that existed 
in the 1930’s. 
The FHLBB and HOLC’s interest in assessing mortgage risk by the neighborhood—the 
impetus for the Residential Security Maps—paralleled a conceptual trend among real estate 
financiers, both private and public, lauding the importance of understanding risk and developing 
measurement techniques. Both government agencies and real estate trade associations published 
articles outlining the production or value of residential security maps in their institutional journals 
in the 1930’s. The journals resemble an echo chamber where ideas, techniques, and similar 
language were circulated, cited, and shared among real estate groups and federal institutions. Trade 
journals were keenly aware of the appraisal practices of federal agencies, particularly the FHA, 
and would often describe federal practices, or even directly copy federal policy, into their 
publications. Racial and class prejudices were routinely present in these articles either explicitly 
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or implicitly referenced via the vague threat of “adverse influences;” enough articles, and even the 
FHA, directly describe African Americans and the poor as “adverse influences” that it is 
reasonably inferred what is meant when similar language is used; enough articles also describe 
“adverse influences” as a large factor in the locational risk of a mortgage that the rationale for the 
technique to be fundamentally tied to these prejudices.   
In 1932, Frederick Babcock, a Chicago realtor and the future deputy administrator FHA 
and director of the Underwriting Division, wrote The Valuation of Real Estate. In his book, 
Babcock established neighborhood appraisal as a critical aspect of lending, arguing that the “future 
history of a property is conditioned by the trend of development of the district and city within 
which the property lies.”58 Babcock ties the value of a property to the condition and character of 
the properties around it. Later in the book, Babcock elaborates on what he saw as a significant 
indicator neighborhood trend:  
“most of the variations and differences between people are slight and value declines 
are, as a result, gradual. But there is one difference in people, namely race, which 
can result in a very rapid decline. Usually such declines can be partially avoided by 
segregation and this device has always been in common usage in the South where 
white and negro populations have been separated.”59  
The concept of measuring a property’s risk or value by the trends of a neighborhood was, 
from its earliest roots, tied to racial prejudice; while Babcock does not describe a map to determine 
risk, his assertion is inherently geographic and thus able to be mapped.  
In 1935, Babcock was working to develop the Underwriting Manual for the FHA and wrote 
an article titled “The Determination of Mortgage Risk” for the Journal of the American Institute 
of Real Estate Appraisers. In the article, Babcock details the rationale for the outline of the 
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Underwriting Manual and the fractional categories of risk, including “The Neighborhood,” that 
compose risk to a lender. He comments that while it would be embarrassing for the FHA to grade 
cities relative to one another, grading neighborhoods poses no such risk. The article also mentions 
how the final appraisal grade is calculated and then assigned a category based on its apparent risk 
ranging from ‘A’ the least risky to ‘D’ the most risky. The FHA would insure mortgages 
categorized ‘C’ or higher but would summarily reject ‘D’ grades.60  
In 1935, the National Association of Real Estate Boards wrote in the National Real Estate 
Journal describing the 1935 FHA Underwriting Manual that was being published at that time and 
encourages readers to anticipate receiving a copy; the national association was going to put 1,000 
copies in the mail. This article also published the categories for appraising risk including the 
weights attached to different criteria within each overall category. The two criteria given the 
greatest weight towards determining the neighborhood’s risk are its stability (a quarter of the total 
risk grade) and “protection from adverse influences” (a fifth of the total grade).61 The FHA also 
published articles describing their methods in their public journal Insured Mortgage Portfolio.62 
These public discussions of the FHA’s Underwriting Manual reveal not only the public discussion 
of government policies but the circulation of a common appraisal language between the 
government and private industry who understood themselves to be partners. 
The FHA first published its Underwriting Manual in 1935 and published a revised version 
in 1936. The manual codified the criteria for a mortgage to qualify for FHA insurance thus served 
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a template for lenders in deciding which borrowers could participate in the housing market. The 
criteria for assessing the riskiness of a mortgage included not just an assessment of the borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan but also a rating of the neighborhood. Some criteria assessed the 
infrastructure of the neighborhood such as “adequacy of transportation”, presence of cultural or 
civic centers and the quality of the utilities but other criteria assessed the demographics of the 
neighborhood and reflected a significant bias towards high income whites. The manual reinforces 
that the value of an individual property is determined by the properties and people around it; value, 
the manual insists, would be negatively affected by “a decline, or danger of decline, of the 
desirability of the neighborhood through the influx of people of lower living standards” or a “lack 
of appropriate and adequate deed restrictions and effective provisions for the enforcement 
thereof.”63 In case there is any ambiguity about the people or deed restrictions the manual refers 
to, the manual later encourages underwriters to diligently investigate the geography of the 
neighborhood, “usually the protection against adverse influences afforded by these means include 
prevention of the infiltration of business and industrial uses, lower- class occupancy, and 
inharmonious racial groups. A location close to a public park or area of similar nature is usually 
well protected from infiltration of business and lower social occupancy coming from that 
direction.”64 In the previous paragraph, the manual describes racially restrictive covenants as 
“more apt than a zoning ordinance in providing protection from adverse influences.”65 While the 
FHA’s Underwriting Manual does not describe a mapping regime, the concept of appraising a 
single property by the surrounding properties—along with harsh racial and social class 
prejudices—was codified into its insurance procedures. 
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Starting in 1934, the Federal Home Loan Bank Review was distributed to member savings 
and loan institutions by the FHLBB to provide a record of its activities.66 Over several years, the 
FHLBB consistently argued for the real estate industry to develop more rigorous, scientific 
procedures for appraisals, particularly by measuring the risk a neighborhood imposed on an 
investment. In 1935, the Board published “A Practical Technic for Making a Real Property 
Survey” to impress upon real estate financiers the necessity of developing property survey maps 
for their cities similar to the project recently published by the Works Progress Administration. The 
Board further describes a regimen for producing such maps by collecting block level data of 
housing units including their construction, age, repair, and modernity, and data of the occupants 
including age, race, number, vacancies, ownership, mortgage status, and rent rates, and a 
corresponding map of land uses. It was advised that the block level data be further tabulated and 
analyzed for different levels of economic activity.67 This is also the exact same regimen that was 
used to develop the City Survey Program and Residential Security Maps that same year.  
Also in 1935, the FHLBB began publishing a series of articles, “Neighborhood Standards 
as They Affect Investment Risk,” outlining and describing ten specific neighborhood risk factors 
on an investment; these factors were intended to aid lenders in making “intelligent and constructive 
judgement on neighborhoods.”68 The eighth risk factor of a neighborhood, according to the 
FHLBB, are the absence or the inadequacy of legal protections such as zoning or deed restrictions 
in a neighborhood. The ninth factor is the demographic composition of the neighborhood and its 
“racial trends.”69 The FHLBB was publishing and legitimatizing the same racial biases as the FHA 
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and normalizing the widely accepted prejudices of the broader real estate industry. These biases 
were inherent in the appraisal of neighborhood risk and woven into both a lender’s geographic 
conception of their city and the construction of property surveys—each a consequence of the 
FHLBB’s published articles. 
In 1936, the FHLBB published more detailed instructions for developing “Security Maps 
for the Analysis of Mortgage Lending Areas.” The article outlined particular criteria to estimate 
investment risk and referred lenders to the aforementioned “Neighborhood Standards” series. 
Building on the regimen described in “A Practical Technic for Making a Real Property Survey,” 
the FHLBB describes a grading system with four, color coded categories (the same as seen in the 
Residential Security Maps). “A” grades are reserved for those neighborhoods with brand new 
construction and well-functioning real estate markets. “B” grades are neighborhoods that would 
have been consider “A” ten to fifteen years prior; however, when they are “infiltrated by a less 
desirable class of people” and begin “definitely declining” and should be reclassified as a “C.” “C” 
areas are typified by “lower grade” population and homes begin to rapidly depreciate. Finally, “D” 
areas generally include all old portions of a city and slum areas. Each grade reflects the safety of 
an investment by the bank and “there are certain “D” areas, especially the slum areas, in which a 
good mortgage man would probably not consider any loans at all.”70 The FHLBB provided lending 
institutions with all of the instruction necessary to make security maps—identical in concept and 
process to the Residential Security Maps—to guide mortgage decision making towards certain 
neighborhoods and away from others. 
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The FHA published The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American 
Cities, written by Homer Hoyt, in 1939. The book attempts to systematically examine the character 
of neighborhoods, the dynamics that create development or decay, and develop mapping 
procedures to evaluate neighborhoods with the larger intended goal of informing home financing 
policy.71 Hoyt’s approach to measure the character of neighborhoods by overlaying layers of data 
on to maps of city blocks. He describes a detailed system of how an appraiser ought to organize 
the map and where to get the publicly available data necessary to fill in the blocks. Eight criteria 
are identified as sufficient measures of a neighborhoods character ranging from owner occupancy 
to building conditions to building ages and finally to the percentage of persons “of a race other 
than white.”72 Based upon the map, appraisers were believed to have sufficient information to 
understand the risk and future direction of a city block and its neighborhood. After describing the 
map, Hoyt elaborates on the relevance of each of the eight criteria and his discussion of race and 
neighborhoods largely advocates for segregation as morally and financially important: “It is in the 
twilight zone, where members of different races live together that racial mixtures tend to have a 
depressing effect upon land values—and therefore, upon rents.”73 In this federally funded study, 
racial prejudices are explicitly professed and are intertwined into the described approach to 
mapping neighborhood value and risk.  
Prejudices against racial and ethnic minorities were commonly taken as a scientific fact 
among appraisers at this time. Often these prejudices took shape among a dynamic hierarchy that 
reflected the differing social status and economic power among different groups and had been 
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embedded into real estate thought for some time. In 1933, Homer Hoyt received his Ph.D. in 
Economics from the University of Chicago. He studied at the university during the same period 
that Ernest Burgess and Robert Park were developing their studies of urban growth. Hoyt’s 
dissertation, One Hundred Years of Land Value in Chicago, described the changing economy of 
land and development in Chicago from 1830 to 1933. A section of his book was devoted to the 
particular impact of different ethnic groups on land value and Hoyt treats the variation in rents as 
a reflection of the variation in desirability—and in literal value—among different racial and ethnic 
communities; Hoyt’s conception of the ethnicity-value hierarchy is reproduced in Table 1. What 
is curious about Hoyt’s discussion of the relationship between ethnicity and value is how 
transparent his cognitive dissonance is. On one hand, Hoyt acknowledges that such comparisons 
“may not be reasonable,” are not scientifically based, and capture other determining inequalities 
and yet he simultaneously attributes—as if fact—race and ethnicity as a direct, determining factor 
in standards of living, land value, and neighborhood quality.74 Hoyt’s conception of this racial 
hierarchy not only reflects beliefs that were common among appraisers but informs the 
development of FHA policy during his time as a government appraiser. One may read Hoyt’s 
account and try to argue that he and other lenders weren’t so much actively discriminating as they 
were conforming to prejudices ubiquitous among consumers. Yet, wrapped up in a lender’s 
deference to the social norms is a comfort and even endorsement of that domination. There are 
clear beneficiaries from such compliance—native, affluent white populations—whose privilege 
comes at the expense of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. The bank’s actions, regardless of 
their motivation, become yet another structural barrier to equality. 
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Ranking by Benefit to Land Values 
1. English, Germans, Scotch, Irish, Scandinavians 
2. North Italians 




7. Russian Jews of the Lower Class 
8. South Italians 
9. Negroes 
10. Mexicans 
Table 1 Homer Hoyt's Ranking of Ethnicity by Land Value 
The concept of mapping neighborhood risk for the purpose of appraising individual 
properties was popularized concurrently in the real estate appraisal industry as it was in the 
government; the concept spread throughout the industry by articles circulating in national 
association publications such as the National Real Estate Journal, the Review of the Society of 
Residential Appraisers, and the Journal of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers.  
In 1937, Paul Stark, President of the National Association of Real Estate Board, lauded, in 
the article “Neighborhood Protection,” published in the National Real Estate Journal, 
neighborhood appraisal’s popularity as “a new general recognition of a fundamental truth, the 
realization of the importance of neighborhood factors as affecting the value of the individual piece 
of real estate” and “has become the central axiom for the real estate appraiser and one that has 
permeated the whole technique of appraisal.”75 This commendation, from an executive position 
such as the President of the national association, reflects how widespread the concept and practice 
had been adopted within the industry by 1937. Further in the article, Stark describes an extension 
of this concept: a statute where groups of property owners could cooperatively create a 
neighborhood plan and “shut out adverse use” in order to “protect and enforce the character of that 
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neighborhood" and to bring blighted areas back into productive use. While the article does not 
specifically refer to poor residents or people of color as adverse uses, contemporary writing by 
government officials and other real estate leaders explicitly do and it is reasonable to understand 
the implied meaning. The proposal would essentially give neighborhood protection groups urban 
planning credentials to zone and restrict development above and beyond restrictive covenants 
already in place at the time. The FHLBB endorsed NAREB’s proposal in two installments of 
“Neighborhood Standards as they Affect Investment Risk,” writing, “neighborhood protective and 
improvement districts merits the closest study by all those who have a financial interest in blighted 
areas.”76 Experts in government and private trade organizations were paying attention to each 
other’s work and cooperating towards a common goal: mitigating investment risk. It was a 
cooperative gesture for the FHLBB to publish and spread NAREB’s work in their own trade 
journal. The perceived threat of the poor and people of color to the financial security of investments 
had elicited a deep response from both private industry and the government.  
The influence of the federal government’s policies and conceptual approach to 
neighborhood risk is apparent in articles published in the Review of the Society of Residential 
Appraisers. In 1938, E. D. Keefer, a Miami realtor, published a slightly revised version of the 
FHA’s risk-rating method, highlighting the appraisal of neighborhood risk, in his article “Risk 
Rating Homes.”77 Louis Pratt cited the FHA’s Underwriting Manual in his 1937 article 
“Appraising Fractional Parts of Residential Property” describing neighborhood appraisal as a 
critical component of appraising a property accurately.78 These articles reveal that neighborhood 
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appraisal programs, developed by the government, were permeating the zeitgeist of real estate 
finance, and that the government, in this case the FHA, was seen as a leader in developing these 
techniques. Government policies were elevating, normalizing, and professionalizing neighborhood 
appraisal techniques. Private officials were paying close attention to the minute details of 
government policy. 
New Deal agencies and reforms had given real estate officials cause to pay close attention 
to the actions of the federal government, which was asserting unprecedented influence into the 
mortgage finance industry. From the 1930’s onward, mortgage finance would be transformed 
towards long-term, amortized, low interest, high loan to value ratio, and, most significantly, 
federally-insured loan products.79 The HOLC was the first federal intervention to introduce such 
standards and the agency applied them to the foreclosed loans that it refinanced. The HOLC 
established a precedent for the changes that would follow.80 A year after the creation of the HOLC, 
Congress created the FHA. The agency expanded the expected characteristics of the modern 
mortgage and was empowered to insure mortgages from private lenders; mortgages and lenders 
that met particular standards.81 The FHA created a variety of exacting criteria for a loan to qualify 
for insurance including specific provisions for neighborhood appraisal—those outlined in the 
Underwriting Manual and republished in some of the trade journals. Yet, by increasing the loan 
period and the loan to value ratio, the federal government significantly increased the risk involved 
in mortgage lending and thus the increased the need for assurances on the long-term value of that 
property. The FHA attempted to offset this risk by providing insurance but the mindset of lenders 
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and appraisers had to incorporate the elevated risk nonetheless. Lenders became wary of making 
loans that would not be insured and thus had to pay even more attention to the standards outlined 
by the FHLBB and, particularly, the FHA.82  
The transformation of the lending market to long-term loan packages fundamentally altered 
the stakes of mortgage lending and thus the approach of appraisal experts. Prejudiced notions of 
race and risk were widely held among the real estate industry prior to the advent of the HOLC and 
the FHA; yet, the elevated risk of long-term mortgages amplified the perceived threat of minority 
communities to investment security.83 It is not just that the government’s intervention and advice 
caught the attention of the private industry: the government’s intervention and transformation of 
the lending market necessitated—in the minds of government officials, appraisers, and lenders—
a greater vigilance towards changing urban conditions and precipitated lending policies, in the vein 
of the Residential Security Maps, that steered investment away from perceived threats such as 
Immigrants, African Americans, and the poor. What accompanied the introduction of long-term 
loan packages was a new construction of risk that emphasized not just the merits of an individual 
application but the character of the surrounding neighborhood in both the present and long into the 
future.  
The City Survey Program and the Residential Security Maps were conceived and 
developed amid a trend in real estate appraisal and finance of estimating neighborhood risk and 
mapping the perceived risk. Government agencies, mainly the FHLBB and the FHA, and trade 
associations wrote extensively about neighborhood risk and techniques to appraise that risk in 
institutional journals during the 1930’s. A conversation among partners began to develop as 
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articles circulated within this pool of experts. Private industry was keenly aware of government’s 
actions, even the minutia of policy—republishing sections of government documents and 
discussing the latest government position. Private industry viewed the government as a leader; 
New Deal programs like the HOLC and FHA were asserting unprecedented government influence 
in the real estate industry at that time and transforming the way mortgage finance functioned. The 
government was not the origin of neighborhood appraisal but was on the forefront of its 
advancement. Explicit in each of these journals, government and industry alike, are prejudiced 
descriptions of the risk people of color and the poor pose to investment security. These racialized 
and otherwise prejudiced conceptions of risk to investment, and even to the perceived 
neighborhood quality, were normalized and printed by the FHLBB; neighborhood appraisal 
techniques, developed in the 1930’s, established the conceptual foundation for discriminatory 
lending practices that existed in cities nationwide for decades. Discrimination in federal housing 
initiatives was not banned until the early 1960’s and it was not until a consent decree in 1976 that 
the Society of Real Estate Appraisers and the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers struck 
racist language from their training materials.84 Banks have also been found to be practicing 
redlining well beyond the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act in 1978.85  
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3.6 NEIGHBORHOOD RISK MAPPING PROGRAMS 
The neighborhood appraisal concept circulating among the real estate industry and federal 
government led to several risk mapping projects each created within a few years of the 
development of the HOLC’s maps. Some mapping projects are discussed in the literature in 
passing; for instance, Hillier (2003) cites other researchers discussing dozens of municipal 
‘redlining maps’ in Miami.86  
In 1934, J.M. Brewer, owner of a real estate information company Property Services, Inc. 
that catered to local lenders and brokers, developed a highly detailed map of Philadelphia’s real 
estate market describing ‘location ratings’ of neighborhood quality, the prevailing age of homes 
in a given block, real estate prices, industrial and commercial zones, and color coded zones 
showing the density of Jewish, Italian, and ‘Colored’ residents. Heavily Jewish areas received 
ratings ranging from ‘B’ (Upper middle class) to ‘D’ (Lower or working class), Italian areas ranged 
from ‘C’ (Middle class) to ‘DE’ (a blend of lower class and decadent), and ‘Colored’ areas 
overwhelming either rated ‘D’ or ‘E’ (decadent) with a handful of ‘C’ blocks. The map also had a 
scaled shading system to reveal the prevalence of a community in those blocks. Jewish blocks 
were shaded blue, Italian blocks were green, and ‘Colored’ blocks were red. A portion of the 
southern section is included as an example (see Figure 3). Brewer was formerly the chief appraiser 
for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, among the largest lenders in Philadelphia at the time, 
and would eventually serve as a map consultant for the 1937 Residential Security Map of 
Philadelphia.87  
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Figure 3 A Portion of J. M. Brewer's Security Map of Philadelphia, PA (1934)
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The FHA published the mapping program developed by the Security First National Bank 
of Los Angeles in 1938, in their journal Insured Mortgage Portfolio. The article, written by a 
researcher for the bank L. Elden Smith, applies the rhetoric and reasoning of the Burgess ecological 
model to assessing neighborhood “life cycles” and mortgage risk. A neighborhood’s stage in its 
life is a direct indication of its mortgage risk according to Smith. The map of Los Angeles 
represents the stage of development from infancy as a subdivision, the lightest, to total decline, the 
darkest. If one were to substitute HOLC’s labels with Security-First’s labels, this map would be 
identical to a Residential Security Map and they are each constructed with the same ideology. A 
scan of the map is provided on the next page (see Figure 4). The bank used the map to guide its 
lending decisions although understood that the maps was just a starting point. Neighborhoods at 
the end of the life cycle is largely marked by “the incursion of inharmonious racial elements” and 
lenders must “follow racial movements with considerable care.”88 Neighborhood appraisal, as it 
has been repeatedly shown, was imbedded with racial prejudice and was given the endorsement 
and legitimacy of the federal government. This particular article was published by FHA but, as has 
been shown, the articles published in FHLBB’s trade journal include the same material. The 
government’s work had a significant influence; Smith acknowledges the role of the government in 
developing neighborhood appraisal, which he notes originated in the time since the depression, 
(and the creation of FHLBB, HOLC, and FHA), and considers the government “a pioneer in 
placing emphasis on the neighborhood influence.”89 To Smith, the security map developed by 
Security-First National Bank was an extension of the governments’ ideology. 
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Figure 4 Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles's map, FHA (1938)
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The Chicago Housing Authority drew a map (see Figure 5) in 1938 representing “mortgage 
risk district established by the Federal Housing Administration” that divided Chicago into four 
districts representing risk and graded from ‘A’ to ‘D.’ 90 ‘Class A’, the highest grade represented 
areas where the FHA “will insure long term mortgages,” ‘Class B’ areas would only receive 
insurance on “mortgages of 20 years or less,” ‘Class C’ for 10 years or less, and “F.H.A. will not 
insure mortgages in Class ‘D’ Districts.” About a quarter of Chicago appears to be rated ‘Class D’ 
with each grade level above less area than the grade below it. The lightest areas of the map are 
considered the best zones and the grading is scaled towards the darkest areas that represent the 
worst zones—perhaps, an implicit performance of the author’s racial ideology. While the map was 
not drawn by the FHA itself and the Chicago Housing Authority may have been inaccurate, it 
represents a bleak picture of perceived risk in Chicago and appears to downgrade Chicago 
significantly compared to the HOLC’s security map in 1939.91 Even those areas that would have 
been considered ‘B’ or ‘C’ were only available for shorter term mortgage insurance, limiting 
financing options for the vast majority of Chicago. These mapping projects reflect a wider 
prevalence of physical security maps beyond the City Survey Program. A high degree of similarity 
exists between each of these maps and the HOLC’s including style, overlay and grading 
conventions indicating that there were common aesthetic expectations for how a security map 
should look. The similarities suggest that developing security maps was a common endeavor. 
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Figure 5 Chicago Housing Authority Map of FHA Lending (1938) 
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3.7 LOCAL INFLUENCES ON THE HOLC 
A consistent theme often lost in the literature amid the details of the HOLC is its reliance upon 
local real estate industry actors to administer the HOLC’s mission. In order to complete the original 
task of refinancing and then servicing loans, state and district offices would contract out appraisals 
and legal proceedings to local appraisers and attorneys on a fee-for-service basis. In 1937, the 
HOLC had contract agreements with a large number of local officials including about 5,000 
appraisers and inspectors, about 15,000 brokers in some capacity and about 8,000 attorneys to 
administer the HOLC’s operation across the country. In total, the HOLC contracted with about 
28,000 local real estate officials compared with a total salaried staff of 14,246.92 The weight of 
local, contracted labor compared to salaried staff reflects the power of local experts to shape the 
administration of the HOLC. Regional offices also relied on local brokers to sell the properties that 
the HOLC would end up foreclosing upon. In at least several instances these foreclosure sales 
would reinforce segregation as “these brokers, in turn, followed local practices in their work for 
the HOLC” and HOLC’s hands off policy “was in effect an endorsement of segregation and racial 
discrimination.”93  
The Residential Security Maps, in particular, were influenced by local experts. When the 
FHLBB decided that the City Survey Program was necessary, part of the reason they chose HOLC, 
instead of another agency under their umbrella, was because of the HOLC’s experience working 
with local real estate conditions and actors.94 The Mortgagee Rehabilitation Committee, 
specifically assigned its field agents to collect the data with the assistance of local realtors and 
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lenders. The surveys field agents were tasked to conduct required interviews and consultations 
with local housing and real estate experts. All of this information was incorporated into the map.95 
Local brokers and appraisers were also involved with drawing the maps, although the literature 
disagrees as to the degree of their involvement. In Miami, HOLC’s appraisals “reflected bias of 
local appraisers” whose home neighborhoods were given the highest ratings.96 There is also 
evidence that the FHLBB chose to keep the maps confidential because of agreements with local 
consultants who contributed information on the condition that they would not be published.97 
Finally, Greer found that one of the strongest positive correlates with the risk grade was the 
qualitative assessments done by field agents—drawn from their interviews with local lenders—of 
how well the lending market functioned in the neighborhood.98 Not only was HOLC’s 
administration strongly dependent on and influenced by local agents but its Residential Security 
Maps would come to embody the influences of local practices as well; this is consistent with 
Crossney and Bartelt’s finding that the maps were attuned to local practices.99 
3.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MAPS 
The Residential Security Maps were a product of the real estate ideology at that time. Experts in 
the industry, private and public alike, advocated an appraisal approach that judged the 
creditworthiness of an individual by their surrounding neighbors. Biases against neighborhoods, 
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social classes and race permeated both the industry and neighborhood appraisal. Trade journals, 
published by private and public institutions, fostered a conversation among banks and regulators 
that not only espoused the conceptual framework of risk mapping but provided specific criteria, 
data sources, and styles. The government saw itself as a leader in neighborhood appraisal and real 
estate officials looked to the government’s work for examples. Private industry did not need access 
to the specific Residential Security Maps because mapping techniques were available in these trade 
journals and even published directly by the FHLBB. Further, lenders did not need physical maps 
to redline: conceptual, mental maps constructed from the same biases against people of color and 
certain housing markets would produce the same effect. Real estate is fundamentally geographic; 
appraisers and financiers understood where black and poor communities existed in their city, 
where industrial facilities were located, and how many loans they financed in a given 
neighborhood. Local lenders were able to make lending decisions based on this knowledge, which 
was also framed by the national conceptual conversation. 
The Residential Security Maps are the best drawn and best preserved example of risk 
mapping, yet, are but one mapping project amid many. Government records had to be preserved; 
private institutions’ records did not. Local actors had a significant role in shaping the HOLC and 
the City Survey Program. The Residential Security maps, from conception to construction, embody 
the real estate industry’s practices and beliefs in the 1930’s. It is no longer arguable that the 
physical maps were directly the precipitator of redlining and urban divestment; instead, these maps 
should be understood as an artifact, a reflection of the industry, and an imperfect vehicle by which 
it is possible to evaluate the consequences of the risk mapping concept and the prejudices pervasive 
throughout the industry at the time.  
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3.9 PHYSICAL LEGACIES 
Appraisal of neighborhood risk and subsequent redlining are often discussed in terms of the 
financial cost to the communities where banks refused to lend and the FHA refused to insure, 
prompting general divestment and decline. The financial legacies of divestment from urban centers 
are well deserving of attention, yet oft neglected are the physical legacies of these systems—the 
impact on the structural and social geography of a city. The risk categories did reflect, to some 
extent, the communities most vulnerable to decline—those with the oldest housing stock, least 
functioning real estate markets, and most underserved populations. Compounded in with the risk 
maps and divestment, was an already fragile and dire situation facing these neighborhoods. 
The Great Depression paralyzed the real estate market in the United States with 
unprecedented unemployment, many bank closures, and a substantial number of foreclosures.100 
Residential construction had peaked in 1925 and, in the early 1930’s, construction of new units 
was at an “extreme low;” further, existing homes were “badly deteriorated through unwillingness 
or inability to keep it in repair.”101 A 1933 Census of housing conditions in sixty four cities 
revealed that about eighteen percent of housing units, vacant or occupied, were in need of major 
repairs or demolition. Further, 58,747 of the homes in the study were reported in bad enough 
condition to be unsuitable for occupation and yet 41,891 of these homes were occupied.102 While 
the HOLC was able to provide relief for homes in foreclosure, the funds provided by the HOLC 
were restricted from being used for repairs.103 A homeowner or landlord, already struggling to 
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make mortgage payments amid the Great Depression, could not reasonably be assumed to have 
spent any significant sum on necessary long term repairs. It is likely that while the financial health 
of the owner and lender were preserved, the physical quality of the home continued to decline.  
Government housing policy hastened the decline of these sections of the city. Both the 
FHA and the FHLBB showed preference against old and poorly constructed homes and 
discouraged lenders, through policy and official publications, from making investments in these 
sections of town.104 In addition to advantages given to newly constructed homes, FHA 
requirements on indoor plumbing and modern amenities such as refrigeration structurally excluded 
the many urban American homes that lacked those features from receiving insurance.105 In fact, 
“much of the housing built before the advent of mortgage insurance in 1934 was rendered difficult 
if not impossible to finance using mortgages that could meet the rigid and inflexible provisions of 
the act and the requirements of FHA appraisal standards.”106 The FHA and FHLBB placed the 
most value in new, green-field construction on the city’s periphery—homes built for professional, 
white families—at the expense of old, already decaying, urban neighborhoods relegating them to 
least valued groups of society—the working class and people of color. 
In Chapter 4, I describe the local conditions in Pittsburgh, the segregation of various 
communities, and the significant disparities in neighborhood quality that comprised a stratified 
geography. It is upon this uneven geography that neighborhood appraisal practices, in Pittsburgh, 
in the 1930’s, shaped patterns of investment. 
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4.0  PITTSBURGH’S HOUSING AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN THE 1930’S 
At the time the City Survey Program was assessing Pittsburgh, the city was the tenth largest in the 
United States and the center of one of the largest industrial centers in the country. The 1930 census 
counted 669,817 residents in Pittsburgh, 75.4% of whom were ‘native white’ and 8.3% were 
African American.107 Employment in Pittsburgh was largely driven by heavy industry, 42.55% of 
men in Pittsburgh worked in manufacturing and mechanical industries.108 Parity existed between 
racial groups in manufacturing by comparing overall employment. Yet, there were staunch barriers 
to employment in other industries: Blacks disproportionately worked in domestic and personal 
service (42.5%) compared to foreign-born whites (14.8%) and native whites (9.3%). In the trade 
industry, Blacks (5.4%) were underrepresented compared to either foreign-born whites (17.5%) or 
native born whites (18.3%). Clerical occupations largely employed native whites (18.9%) and were 
far less available to either Blacks (2.3%) or foreign-born whites (3.8%).109 Economic divisions in 
the city mirrored divisions in other aspects of the city, including housing. 
Allegheny County and Pittsburgh had a range of housing conditions throughout the county 
with pockets of blight and pockets of luxury. In 1935, Allegheny County had an owner-occupancy 
rate of 43.5% and a vacancy rate of 6.9%. Housing units were generally in good condition but a 
significant portion of housing units were in need of major repairs (17.9%), lacked bathing facilities 
(30.9%), an indoor toilet (20.1%), or furnace-type heating (44.1%).110 Insufficient housing was 
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concentrated into a few sections of the city. A 1934 survey of housing in the City of Pittsburgh 
differentiated “dark spots” (Downtown, the Hill District, Lawrenceville, South Side, Manchester) 
from “bright spots” (Shadyside, Highland Park, Beechview, Squirrel Hill, Point Breeze) and found 
a wide gap in housing conditions between the two groups (see Table 2).111 The “dark spots” lagged 
significantly behind in upgrades and amenities that by that time were nearly ubiquitous in other 
areas of the city. 
Percentage of Units Without: Dark Spots Bright Spots City of Pittsburgh 
an Indoor Toilet 24.8 1.6 12.1 
Gas or Electric Lighting 8.8 0.5 3.6 
Furnace-Type Heating 84.3 12.9 50.2 
Table 2 Disparities in Housing Quality, A Social Study of Pittsburgh (1934) 
“Blighted” sections of housing existed throughout the city but were most concentrated near 
industrial centers; generally these areas were home to immigrants, people of color and the poor. 
Conditions in all of these areas were grim, to say the least. A 1928 survey of housing conditions, 
administered by the then newly created Pittsburgh Housing Authority, found “dirt, disorder, and 
dilapidation … in practically every neglected district,” a host of unsanitary apartments including 
some inside butcher shops and stables, and extensive overcrowding. Further the survey found that 
“neglect by the owner of his responsibility for the condition of his property is frequently the cause 
of unfit living conditions.”112 These neighborhoods were inhospitable and yet home to a good 
portion of Pittsburgh’s working class. 
While housing conditions were rough for much of Pittsburgh, people of color faced even 
more limited housing options. In the mid 1930’s, 45% of African Americans in Pittsburgh lived in 
the Hill District and an additional 25% lived in East Liberty and Homewood. People of color 
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largely lived in blighted sections of town and their homes were “more concentrated at the lowest 
standards recorded.”113 In Pittsburgh, a number of barriers prevented African Americans from 
living in better conditions but in the 1920’s “new zoning laws reinforced the racially segregated 
housing market and made it increasingly difficult for blacks to inhabit structures defined as ‘fit for 
human habitation.’”114 Many aspects of life in Pittsburgh were segregated to some degree. Banks 
and insurance companies had segregated offices and offered limited and restricted service to 
Blacks compared to what was available to whites.115 
The deep divisions in housing driven by class, ethnicity, and race were readily apparent to 
the appraisers and real estate experts who assessed Pittsburgh’s housing submarkets for the City 
Survey Program. These divisions did not inspire fundamental questions of inequality within the 
appraisers’ minds but confirmed preconceived notions of neighborhood structure—part of the 
natural ‘ecology’ of a city as theorized by Ernest Burgess. Wrapped in to the assessment of 
neighborhoods were not only biases against minority groups but also observations of the divisions 
in housing quality and neighborhoods that paralleled the divisions of class, race, and ethnicity.116 
Because of the way these divisions had already constructed the divides in housing, even if HOLC 
appraisers had drawn a map that only graded housing quality, the map would have 
disproportionately labeled immigrant, black, and poor communities as hazardous. Of course, it is 
well documented that the appraisers were grading the population as well as the housing but it is 
important to appreciate that so many of these factors were already woven together. The City Survey 
Program was not a housing improvement program nor was it a community revitalization agenda—
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the City Survey Program was an attempt by federal officials to map the investment security of 
different neighborhoods. A map constructed under that rationale would, of course, grade sections 
of dilapidated housing as hazardous.  
 
Figure 6 A Tenement House on Bedford Court, Pittsburgh Housing Commission (pre-1934) 
To give an extreme example, without being reductive but still giving some perspective, 
consider the two photos. The first (Figure 6), is a tenement that was occupied by ten families who 
shared a single outdoor source of water.117 These row homes were located on Bedford Court in the 
Hill District in the early 1930’s. This area would be labeled “Hazardous.” The second picture 
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(Figure 7) is of three single family homes on Berkshire Avenue in Brookline in 1924.118 Each 
home has their own yard and they are not only aesthetically appealing but seem to be very well 
constructed. This area would be considered “best” and be outlined green or “first grade.” 
 
 
Figure 7 Single Family Homes on Berkshire Avenue in Brookline, City of Pittsburgh (1924) 
The Pittsburgh Residential Security Map was published on July 20, 1937, along with a 
summary file of the city’s real estate market. The security map itself was drawn upon a 1935 Cram 
Company street map of Pittsburgh. The summary file credits twelve local property management 
brokers and three local realtors with helping to develop the map and grade each of the 
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submarkets.119 In 1937, the most recent and intense home construction was in Squirrel Hill, 
Homewood, Swissvale, Bellvue, Ben Avon, Dormont, and Mt. Lebanon, areas that would receive 
first grade ratings.120 Pittsburgh had fairly stable neighborhood structure; the HOLC summary file 
notes, in an almost impressed tone, that despite the significant presence of African Americans and 
first-generation immigrants “almost no neighborhoods are being affected by infiltration of less 
desirable races” and there has not been “real changes in neighborhood character.”121 A desirable 
notion for appraisers and lenders of that time, the statement reflects a static quality to Pittsburgh’s 
segregation and disparities.  
Urban actors in Pittsburgh, from HOLC appraisers to local lenders, operated in a highly 
stratified city with deep disparities and segregation. Uncritical surveys of these conditions 
simultaneously founded and confirmed neighborhood appraisers’ assumptions and prejudices 
about different communities’ relationship to neighborhood quality, investment safety, and their 
intrinsic value. The federal government’s leadership and participation in the development of 
neighborhood appraisal, conceptually and methodologically, normalized and legitimatized its 
growth into a standard practice. The HOLC applied this ideology to the Residential Security Maps 
while lenders applied the same ideology in their real estate practices. The Residential Security 
Maps represent this ideology and, as that same ideology got applied to urban spaces by private 
lenders, even by those who never saw the physical map, the maps’ description of space was 
reproduced; the differential access to mortgages inspired by the ideology maintained stratification.  
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5.0  METHODOLOGY 
Much of the research about the Residential Security Maps has focused on either their construction 
or how well the maps correspond to the lending habits of the HOLC or other financiers. Several 
researchers have attempted to reconstruct the logic behind the grades using correlation and 
regression.122 Others have used foreclosure statistics, HOLC loan documents, or 1940 Census data 
about mortgages prevalence to measure the impact of HOLC lending on housing finance and the 
influence of the Residential Security Maps on other lenders.123 I was unable to find any research 
that examined the legacies of the Residential Security Maps beyond the immediate context in 
which they were constructed. Given the propensity for conceptualizations of space to create the 
conditions that were described and the abundant literature produced by the FHLBB describing the 
process of mapping neighborhood appraisal, it is important to assess the legacy of the Residential 
Security Maps in a broader scope.  I developed a Geographic Information System (GIS) based 
framework to assess the association between the 1937 Residential Security Map of Pittsburgh and 
the city’s modern social geography. 
The cumulative effects of neighborhood appraisal and ensuing financial divestment from 
certain neighborhoods would theoretically have negative impacts on these spaces. This would 
concentrate disadvantage and create inequalities between communities that would compound over 
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time. Do communities that were historically blocked from investment—those categorized as 
yellow or red—have persistent inequalities compared to communities that had secured and 
continued investment over time—those categorized as blue or green? And specifically, to what 
extent is the 1937 Residential Security Map reflected by the modern social geography of 
Pittsburgh? Did the conceptualization of Pittsburgh neighborhoods produce the conditions and 
divisions in modern Pittsburgh that the appraisers originally observed in the 1930’s? 
To analyze the legacies of redlining, census tract data was attached to the residential 
security grades to assess not only the impact of the practice but also establish who was affected in 
1940 and in more modern Pittsburgh. My analysis begins by expanding on the historical work 
done in Pittsburgh. Crossney and Bartelt, in “Residential Security, Risk and Race,” developed a 
model of the factors that influenced the Pittsburgh map, but it is important to understand not just 
how the map was made but how different communities and conditions were graded. Demographic 
data from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) was then used to analyze the association 
between the 1937 map and the persistence of a number of neighborhood characteristics in 
Pittsburgh’s modern social geography. Using standardized censuses, tracts that have persistently 
covered the poorest residents or the most struggling housing markets—those with repeated 
concentrated disadvantages—were identified and compared to the Residential Security Map.  
5.1 DATA COLLECTION 
The Residential Security Maps are an artifact that give access to the conventional approaches of 
real estate appraisal in the 1930’s and to the local influences that make each urban market unique. 
The 1937 map of Pittsburgh was obtained from Urban Oasis: a site that hosts archives of the 
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Residential Security Maps online in partnership with John Hopkins University, University of 
Maryland, and University of Richmond.124 The map is focused on Pittsburgh but also includes 
some surrounding suburbs including portions of Mt. Lebanon, Braddock, Verona and Ross 
Township. The map categorized the housing submarkets of the Pittsburgh area from ‘First Grade’ 
(green) to ‘Fourth Grade’ (red). The map also outlined industrial areas, the commercial district, 
and spaces without housing. Overall, the map grades 44,700 acres of residential areas. This is a 
little bit larger than the City of Pittsburgh (37,000 acres) and about a tenth the size of Allegheny 
County (477,000 acres). As shown in Table 3, yellow, blue, and red represented the largest portions 
of the city and only a few pockets received green grades. 
Grade Acreage Percent 
Green 2,773 6.2% 
Blue 14,051 31.4% 
Yellow 16,233 36.3% 
Red 11,645 26.1% 
Table 3 Coverage and Size of each Security Grade 
To evaluate legacies, we must first have some context of how communities rated red, 
yellow, blue, or green differed from one another when the maps were drawn.  The 1940 Census 
provides the closest demographic descriptions of Pittsburgh to the 1937 map. The National 
Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS), published by the University of Minnesota, 
provides access to the 1940 Census data tables and to a reconstructed census tract shapefile.125 
NHGIS researchers reconstructed the tract maps using common lines with the 2000 TIGER map 
and drew new lines to uniquely fit the original 1940 map as needed. The researchers have updated 
their data tables drawn along the 2008 tract geography but recommend that the 2000 data tables 
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be used along with other 2000 census information. In 1940, there were 491 tracts covering the 
county.  
To make comparisons between censuses and thus evaluate persistence over time, it is 
critical to have tracts conform to common boundaries. The Neighborhood Change Database 
standardizes tracts into 2000 census tract boundaries, allowing observations to be made from 1970 
through to 2000.126 The data was attributed into 2000 tract boundaries by assigning 1990 blocks 
to 2000 tracts, making the 1990 data relatively straightforward to convert. 1970 and 1980 data 
were first assigned to 1990 blocks and then apportioned to 2000 tracts. 1970, 1980, and 1990 data 
had to be normalized to the 2000 tracts: count data for population and housing units was adjusted 
using a weighted sum and median data was adjusted using a weighted average.127 There were 416 
census tracts covering Allegheny County in 2000. 
5.2 MEASURING HISTORIC REDLINING STATUS 
Measuring and evaluating the historic redlining status of an area requires relating data from the 
scan of the Residential Security Map to two distinct census tract geographies—a process only 
possible through the construction of a geographic information system. First the information from 
the map must be extracted into a reconstructed shapefile. Because the Residential Security Map 
was overlaid upon a 1935 street map of the city, a shapefile of modern street centerlines, published 
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by Allegheny County, could be used to associate the digital image with geographic references.128 
Once referenced, a digital shapefile could be drawn upon the digital image (see Figure 8). The 
Residential Security Map now exists in a common file type with the 1940 and 2000 census tract 
shapefiles; all were projected into the 1983 North American Datum State Plane System on 
Pennsylvania’s southern plate. 
Even though the files all existed in a common projection system, the boundaries for the 
tract maps do not align with the boundaries of the security grades, nor are entire tracts always 
contained by the grades. Drawing conclusions is not possible without relating the shapefiles over 
common areas. The grades shapefile was then intersected with the tracts shapefile to create 
subtracts. The number of subtracts was larger than the original number of tracts because a single 
tract might be covered by several different grades. After the intersection, there were 648 subtracts 
for the 1940 census and 514 subtracts for the 2000 census. The intersected tract maps are visible 
in Figures 9 and 10, respectively. 
Because portions of some tracts cover only a portion of the size of the original tracts, 
population weights were constructed that adjusted count variables proportionately to the coverage 
of subtracts. To improve the accuracy of the population weights, large empty spaces in the city 
were erased from the tract shapefiles prior to intersecting them with the grade shapefile. The five 
2010 Census Tracts that covered Schenley Park, Frick Park, Highland Park, Allegheny Cemetery, 
and Riverview Park were used because they were intentionally drawn to capture empty space, 
covered both the parks and the cemetery and were drawn by a common author.129 
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Figure 8 Digitized Residential Security Map for Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1937)
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Figure 9 1940 Census Tracts Intersected with Residential Security Grades
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Figure 10 2000 Census Tracts Intersected with Residential Security Grades
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5.3 NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS AND CONDITIONS 
Previous research has relied on a variety of population and housing measures, largely from the 
1940 Census, for their analysis. A summary of a few prominent papers including the variables that 
were used and for what purpose is shown in Table 4. All of the authors included some measurement 
of housing value, owner occupancy rate, housing age, and the presence of Black and immigrant 
communities. The variables that were used in previous research guided many of the decisions of 
which variables to include in my analysis. 


























availability   Yes  Yes 
Housing value Median Median Average Median Median 
Owner 
occupancy rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing 
quality Yes  Yes  Yes 
Housing age Median Percent pre-1920 Average 
Percent pre-
1920 Median 
Rent  Median  Median  
Single Units or 
Duplexes  Yes  Yes  
Black Percent Percent Dummy Percent Percent 
Immigrant Percent Percent Dummy Percent Percent by ethnicity 
Crowding Yes     
Income   Yes   
Table 4 Key Variables from Selected Papers 
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5.3.1 1940 Variables 
Contemporary neighborhood conditions are partially determined by their history. To assess 
historic legacies present in modern communities, I first determined how communities that received 
a green or blue grade compared to those communities that received a yellow or red grade. The 
1940 Census was used to measure neighborhood conditions in each category. Although the 1940 
Census lacks the breadth of questions included in modern censuses, the data that is available 
provides valuable context for how these graded areas compared when they were originally drawn. 
Each of these counts was weighted, by the coverage of the intersected tract relative to the original 
tract size, and then aggregated to the overall grade. The first variables considered are the counts of 
total, native white, immigrant, and black population to assess how many people were affected by 
each grade and if people of color were more likely than other groups to be in red and yellow grades.  
Next, several housing variables are considered including occupancy rate, ownership rate, 
average value, abandonment and building condition. These variables allows a snapshot of housing 
conditions to be compared grade by grade. Abandoned units are vacant units that are neither for 
rent nor for sale and thus vacant for an extended time period. The crowding variable was calculated 
by dividing the total weighted number of people by the total weighted number of housing units. 
To bolster the measurement of crowding, the population density of each grade was calculated by 
dividing the total number of persons in the grade by the overall acreage. Crowding and density 
give a better perspective of how communities are structured. The average value of homes in each 
of the grades was calculated by first multiplying the median value of a tract by the weighted 
number of housing units in that tract then dividing the weighted aggregate value by the total of 
number of units in the grade overall and finally summing the values of the tracts for each of the 
grades. All of the variables from the 1940 census are drawn from individual categories and none 
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of them were recalculated unless otherwise stated, aside from the proportional weight based upon 
coverage. The 1940 variables used are summarized in Table 5. 
Variable Calculation 
Total Population as given 
Black Population as given 
Native White Population as given 
Immigrant Population sum of foreign born white male and female populations 
Crowding total population divided by total  housing units 
Density total population divided by acreage of tract 
Occupancy Rate occupied units divided by total housing units 
Poor Condition units in need of major repairs divided by total housing units 
Owner Occupancy Rate owner occupied units divided by occupied housing units 
Abandonment Rate vacant units not for sale or rent divided by total housing units 
Average Value median value aggregated by total reporting housing units 
Table 5 Variables from the 1940 Census and their Source 
5.3.2 1970 to 2000 Variables 
The lingering effects of redlining were assessed by comparing standardized census data prepared 
by the NCDB. The analysis used two related yet distinct groups of variables: demographic (who 
is living in these communities?) and physical (what is the built environment like in these 
communities?). The demographic variables are largely percentages based upon the total 
population; housing variables are also largely percentages but they are based upon the total housing 
units. Redlining had the simultaneous geographic impact on those who live in the graded areas and 
on what was built there.   
The demographic measures used were total population, the total black population, average 
income, and percent poverty. Total population is measured consistently over time and is used to 
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judge if redlined communities were less stable and more susceptible to citywide population 
declines than the communities that were labeled green or blue. Population decline is calculated by 
the percent change from 1970 to each of the other three census years. By basing each of the three 
measures of population decline in 1970, it is possible to evaluate the cumulative population loss 
along a consistent benchmark. Measuring the percent change across each decade would have 
produced results based upon a shifting position and would have been more difficult to draw 
meaningful conclusions.  
Because the presence of people of color was a factor in determining the original grades, it 
is important to assess whether Black Pittsburghers remain segregated into red and yellow areas or 
if they are now equally likely to live in blue and green areas. The relationship between modern 
segregation and historic neighborhood appraisal is measured using the percentage of Black people 
in the tract. Because neighborhood appraisal and ensuing disinvestment blocked redlined 
communities from accessing traditional avenues of accumulating wealth and because economic 
class was a factor included in neighborhood appraisal, I included the poverty rate and average 
income of tracts to assess whether historic patterns of economic segregation have persisted 
geographically in modern Pittsburgh. Average income was used because it was reported in each 
of the four censuses and median income was not reported in the 1970 Census. Each of the four 
demographic measures were proportions and thus did not need to be weighted by the coverage of 
the tract—multiplying both the dividend and divisor by the same amount has no impact on the 
quotient. These decisions are summarized in Table 6. 
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Variable Calculation 
Percent Change in Population 
1970-1980; 1970-1990; 1990-2000 
total population for 1980, 1990, and 2000 
subtracted by 1970 total population and then 
divided by 1970 total population 
Percent Black in 
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
Black population divided by 
the total population in each respective year 
Poverty Rate in 
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 as given 
Average Income in 
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 as given 
Table 6 Demographic Variables from the NCDB and their Source 
The housing measures used were occupancy rate, home ownership rate, black home 
ownership rate, abandonment rate, and average value. Additionally, I focused on the impact of 
historic neighborhood appraisal on units built before 1940 by assessing the demolition and 
prevalence of the old units between 1970 and 1980. Previous research has measured home 
ownership, home value, and home age and I included each of these variables in my analysis. The 
occupancy rate is calculated as the portion of occupied units out of all housing units. The 
abandonment rate is calculated as the portion of vacant units that are neither for sale nor for rent 
out of all housing units. These two variables provide some indication of the demand for housing 
in a community; vacancy and abandonment would, theoretically, be higher in communities where 
fewer people are interest in living, there are more delinquent property owners, and, perhaps, less 
stability. Occupancy rate and abandonment rate were both percentages and thus were not weighted 
by coverage. Each decision about housing variables from the NCDB are summarized in Table 7. 
I measured ownership in the community because it was a factor in determining the grades, 
has been used in previous research about the maps, and is directly related to community’s access 
to mortgage funds. The ownership rate was calculated as the portion of owner-occupied units out 
of the total number of occupied units in the community. Neighborhood appraisal, redlining, and 
mortgage discrimination prevented people of color from accessing traditional mortgage funds. To 
 78 
estimate the degree to which historic neighborhood appraisal impacted modern home ownership 
among African Americans, I divided the number of Black-owner-occupied units by the total 
number of Black-occupied units. Previous research has also assessed the value of homes. I 
calculated the average value of home in a tract by dividing the aggregate value of specified units, 
which was reported in each census, by the total number of specified units in the tract. Ownership 
rates and average value are proportions and were not weighted according to coverage. 
Variable Calculation 
Occupancy Rate in 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000 
occupied housing units divided by total housing units 
in each respective year 
Abandonment Rate in 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000 
vacant units not for rent or for sale divided by total housing 
units in each respective year 
Home Ownership Rate in 
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
owner occupied units divided by occupied housing units 
in each respective year 
Black Home Ownership Rate 
in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
Black owner occupied units divided by Black occupied 
housing units in each respective year 
Average Value in 1970, 1980, 
1990, 2000 
aggregate value of specified housing units divided by total 
specified housing units in each respective year 
Total Housing Units Built 
Before 1940 in 1970 
housing units built before 1940 weighted by tract coverage 
and aggregated by grade in 1970 
Percentage Of Old Units in 
1970 and 1980 
housing units built before 1940 divided by the total number 
of housing units in 1970 and 1980 
Rental Rate in 1970 renter occupied units divided by occupied housing units in 1970 
Old Unit Rental Rate in 1970 renter occupied housing units built before 1940 divided by the total number of housing units built before 1940 
Table 7 Housing Variables from the NCDB and their Source 
Finally, I measured the presence of units built before 1970 and 1980. I only compared 1970 
to 1980 in order to isolate a generation of homes and see how historic disinvestment impacted the 
oldest housing units over the course of that decade. First, I weighted the number of units built 
before 1940 in 1970 according to census tract coverage then aggregated the number of old units 
by security grade. I compare the total number of housing units in 1940 to the total number of 
housing units in 1970 that were built before 1940 to assess whether red and yellow areas experience 
more demolitions—a reflection of both deteriorated housing conditions from lack maintenance 
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and disinvestment and of exposure to urban renewal projects. Then I assess the prevalence of old 
units, those built before 1940, among all housing units in 1970. Next, I assess the relationship 
between security grade and demolition of old units between 1970 and 1980 to measure the impact 
of historic disinvestment on building conditions. Again, I assess the prevalence of old units by 
security grade, this time in 1980. The prevalence of old units in 1970 and 1980 is a reflection of 
both the character of housing and investment in new construction by grade. Finally, I will assess 
the use of these older units, by historic grade, by calculating the rental rate for old units. If old 
units are more likely to be owner occupied, it is, perhaps, more likely that they are well maintained 
as well. However, if old units are more likely to be passed down to renters, who are more transient 
and not responsible for the condition of the unit, it is, perhaps, more likely that the units are less 
maintained and in worse condition. The number of units built before 1940 will be weighted by 
coverage in 1970 for the comparison, in aggregate terms, to the 1940 Census. However, the other 
variables, which are percentages, are not weighted. 
5.4 MEASURING LEGACIES 
To assess the impact of neighborhood appraisal on Pittsburgh’s modern social geography, I 
focused on the spaces that persistently exhibited similar neighborhood conditions. Most of the 
1970 to 2000 variables in my analysis were scaled within their respective census year by 
subtracting the mean from each observation and dividing by the standard deviation. The mean and 
standard deviation were determined from the sample of tracts that received a grade, excluding 
duplicate tracts to prevent weighting and unwanted skew. Comparing tracts within each census 
controls for movement in the distribution between censuses because the scale is relative to the 
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distribution of the variable for that year. Further, assessing the distribution of tracts within a census 
means that it is not necessary to adjust dollar amounts for inflation because the dollar values are 
only being directly compared within a given year. This scaling indicates the relative position of a 
tract within that census’s distribution. Variables were flagged if they are more than a standard 
deviation from the mean in each of the four census years and thus are persistently extreme towards 
one end of the distribution. Frequency tables were constructed to associate these persistent tracts 
with the residential security grade that they received in 1937. Chi-squared tests or Fischer’s exact 
tests were used to test the independence of the persistence of a variable and the historic appraisal 
of that space. A few cases, those that evaluate change over time, were not measured by persistence; 
instead, population decline and the assessment of units built before 1940 were compared by 
historic redlining status using a difference of means test. 
5.5 ASSUMPTIONS 
This analysis relies on four assumptions: two methodological ones about using census data and 
two conceptual ones about the ability to measure historical effects. The first assumption is standard 
within spatial analysis relying on field data: populations are evenly distributed across the census 
tract. There are clear violations to this—census tracts cover parks, streets, businesses, and rivers—
but it is a necessary assumption to work with census data. Perhaps it is likely that at a more granular 
level, like a block, there are many deviations from the tract—a disproportionate number of rental 
units because of a high-rise or an absence of people altogether because of a park—which are 
smoothed over in the aggregate. Perhaps, given other information, it would be reasonable to 
assume that in a 1940 tract, that was 95% covered by the HOLC map, the population would be 
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entirely living in the graded area. Yet, these decisions are impossible to make correctly for the 
entire map of Pittsburgh; it is necessary to assume that the population is evenly distributed and 
distribute population proportionately to the coverage of each intersecting tract.  
A second assumption relates to how the NCDB standardizes census tracts into common 
boundaries. This requires a tremendous number of assumptions and calculations that perhaps 
deviate from reality but are, nonetheless, the most reasonable procedure.130 For instance, in a few 
tracts, the number of units built before 1940 marginally increased from 1970 to 1980. In the process 
of realigning the older census to the 2000 tracts, some counts were inevitably misappropriated. 
While these deviations are incorrect in a few instances, the deviations are even among the overall 
population of adjusted tracts. 
Fundamental to any assessment of historical legacies is a presumption that historic 
dynamics can be detected in contemporary statistics. A common fallacy generally, but particularly 
applicable to contemporary discussions of racism, is that historical practices do not shape future 
conditions. In their piece, “What is Racial Domination?” Desmond and Emirbayer challenge this 
“ahistorical fallacy.” They write, “today’s society is directed, constructed, and molded by—indeed 
grafted onto—the past.”131  While the statement applies broadly, it is particularly poignant in 
considering the geographic and historic foundation of Pittsburgh’s divisions and the neighborhood 
appraisal practices developed in the 1930’s but practiced into the present. Several studies have 
shown the effects of historic practices in modern contexts. Patrick Sharkey’s book, Stuck in Place, 
examines how racial inequality has been persistent and even has been inherited by younger 
                                                 
130 John R. Logan, Zengwang Xu, and Brian J. Stults, "Interpolating US decennial census tract data from as early as 
1970 to 2010: A longitudinal tract database," The Professional Geographer 66, no. 3 (2014): 412-420.; 
131 Matthew Desmond and Mustafa Emirbayer, “What Is Racial Domination,” Du Bois Review 6, no. 2 (2009): 335–
55. 
 82 
generations of African Americans. Sharkey argues that urban neighborhood conditions for 
African-American families in the 1960’s, typified by segregation and concentrated disadvantage, 
created gaps in a variety of statistical measures, such as wealth, that are inherited generationally.132 
Historic effects can even have psychological repercussions; Mindy Fullilove’s study of 
Pittsburgh’s Hill District, Root Shock, found psychological and community scars, precipitated by 
the destruction of the Lower Hill District and displacement of thousands, decades after the events 
themselves.133  
Finally, my research rests on the assumption that the lending industry impacted a large 
enough portion of homes for their neighborhood appraisal practices to have had a widespread and 
determining effect. The private housing market would have likely affected, in some capacity, the 
vast majority of housing units. By the early 1960’s, the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh 
had constructed only 7,011 units.134 This was a minute amount compared to the 189,000 units in 
the City of Pittsburgh overall in 1970. The overwhelming portion of units supplied by the private 
market, combined with a citywide ownership rate of roughly 49% in 1970, suggests that mortgage 
lenders had tremendous opportunity to employ neighborhood appraisal and thus shape housing 
conditions in Pittsburgh. 135  
 
                                                 
132 Patrick Sharkey, Stuck in Place (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013). 
133 Mindy T. Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts America, and What We Can Do 
About It (One World/Ballantine Books, 2004). 
134 Trotter and Day, Race and Renaissance, 74-75, 216. 
135 Tatian, NCDB, 2002. 
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6.0  THE LEGACY OF THE HOLC ON PITTSBURGH’S NEIGHBORHOODS 
To assess HOLC’s impact on Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods, it is necessary to examine neighborhood 
characteristics at the time the maps were made and in more modern Pittsburgh. My analysis first 
examines how conditions varied by grade to develop a broader sense of what distinguished one 
grade from another. Next, I examine conditions in modern Pittsburgh by assessing the persistence 
of a number of variables across time and the relationship between persistence and the security 
grade. I begin by discussing patterns and changes across time in the distribution of variables. Then, 
I assess the relationship between demographic variables and security grade, finding that red and 
yellow areas were more likely to have persistent poverty, Black populations, and population loss 
while green and blue areas were most likely to have the highest average incomes. Next, I assess 
the relationship between housing conditions and security grade: tracts that persistently have the 
highest levels of homeownership—regardless of the race of the home owner—and the highest 
home values were concentrated into green and blue areas. Finally, I assess the presence of old units 
by security grade and find that red and yellow areas had a greater portion of old units demolished, 
had older housing stocks, more renters, and more renters housed in old units. The association 
between persistent conditions in modern Pittsburgh and the historic appraisal of those areas reflects 
a permanence to Pittsburgh’s social geography and the impact of conceptualized appraisal on 
Pittsburgh.  
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6.1 1940 CONDITIONS, BASED ON CENSUS DATA 
Assessing the legacies of the Residential Security Maps requires understanding the different 
significance of the security map categories. Amid the conversation about the maps’ 
disproportionate impact on communities of color, it is important to understand who was affected 
by each security category. It is equally important to keep in mind that these numbers are estimates 
of who was affected based upon the security category coverage of a census tract. Additionally, the 
numbers are aggregated for each category. 
The Pittsburgh Residential Security Map disproportionately included people of color and 
immigrants in lower categories, particularly in “Hazardous” areas (see Table 8). More people lived 
in red or yellow areas than in blue and green areas meaning that the population is generally skewed 
towards the lower categories. To control for the skew, it is important to understand the number of 
people as a share of that category’s population. For instance, immigrants were slightly more likely 
to live in red areas because, while they were roughly twelve percent of the overall population, they 
were fourteen percent of the population in red areas. Immigrants were slightly underrepresented 
in the green and blue grades as well but not to a significant degree. However, people of color lived 
disproportionately in red areas. People of color were twice as likely to live in a red area as they 
should have been. Yet they were two times less likely to live in a yellow area and five time less 
likely to live in either a blue or green area. Overall, more than three out of four people of color 
lived in area considered “Hazardous” and nineteen out of twenty lived in an area considered either 
“Hazardous” or “Declining.” As research has consistently found for other cities, Pittsburgh’s 
Residential Security Map disproportionately people of color. Yes, many native white workers were 
impacted as well—redlining was a wider practice than being exclusively racist—but, unlike for 
white communities, a significant majority of people of color experienced redlining. 
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Red Yellow Blue Green All Grades 
Total Population 303,013 307,141 182,507 27,958 820,619 
   Black Pop. 50,270 12,339 2,536 442 65,587 
   Black Share 16.6% 4.0% 1.4% 1.6% 8.0% 
Total White Pop. 252,606 294,732 179,977 27,512 754,827 
   Immigrant Pop. 43,533 36,496 17,102 2,745 99,875 
   Immigrant Share 14.4% 11.9% 9.4% 9.8% 12.2% 
   Native White Pop. 209,073 258,235 162,875 24,767 654,952 
   Native White Share 69.0% 84.1% 89.2% 88.6% 79.8% 
Percent of Total Pop. 36.9% 37.4% 22.2% 3.4% 100% 
   Percent of Blacks 76.7% 18.8% 3.9% 0.7% 100% 
   Percent of Whites 33.5% 39.1% 23.8% 3.6% 100% 
   Percent of Immigrants 43.6% 36.9% 17.1% 2.7% 100% 
Table 8 Population Characteristics by Security Grade, 1940 
Housing conditions ranged across grades with better conditions in green areas and worse 
conditions in red areas. Across all grades, there were high levels of unit occupancy that decreased 
marginally as the grade improved. As Table 9 shows, the city-wide average for occupancy was 
97.5% which was weighted upwards by the greater of number of housing units in red and yellow 
areas. Occupancy rates were lowest for green areas where 94.6% of units were occupied. Overall, 
occupancy was high across the city. Similarly, crowding, as measured by the number of people 
per housing unit, is even across the grades. It slightly decreases across the grades from 3.8 people 
per unit in red areas to 3.5 people per unit in green areas. While the average number of people in 
a housing unit was steady across the grades, the density of people changed significantly from grade 
to grade. People in red areas were living in communities more than twice as dense as those living 
in either blue or green areas. Abandonment was consistently low (less than 1%) across the four 
grades. The consistency of these three variables suggests a steady demand for homes across the 
four grades. Owner occupancy increased as the grade improved, rising from 24.5% in red areas to 
36.5% in yellow areas and about 43% in blue and green areas. The average value of homes differed 
dramatically between grades. The average value of homes in red and yellow areas were $2,677 
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and $3,951, respectively, compared to $6,631 in the blue grade and $11,356 in the green. While 
the 1940 census didn’t measure income, the more than four-fold increase in average home value 
from red to green combined with the about nineteen-point increase in home ownership suggests 
that income and wealth increased as the grade improved. Further, poor condition units, those 
indicated as in need of major repairs, were most prevalent in red areas. The prevalence of these 
units decreased steadily as the grade level increased with about 2.5% of units in green areas in 
poor condition. This is another indication of financial status because those with enough money 
would presumably be more easily able to maintain their home. The Residential Security Map’s 
grading criteria captured the divides in Pittsburgh’s geography. Grades ranged according to the 
appraisers opinion of the population and the quality of housing in Pittsburgh. 
 
Red Yellow Blue Green All Colors 
Occupancy Rate 98.0% 97.9% 96.9% 94.7% 97.5% 
Poor Condition 14.2% 8.7% 5.5% 2.4% 9.7% 
Abandonment Rate 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.7% 0.2% 
Owner Occupancy 24.5% 36.6% 43.6% 43.2% 34.1% 
Average Value 
(in 1939 Dollars) 2,677 3,951 6,631 11,356 4,384 
Crowding Rate 
(Pop. per Unit) 3.80 3.75 3.54 3.51 3.71 
Density 
(Pop. per Acre) 26.02 18.92 12.99 10.08 18.36 
Table 9 Housing Conditions by Security Grade, 1940 
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6.2 PERSISTENT CONDITIONS FROM 1970 TO 2000 
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Pittsburgh experienced change in a variety of characteristics from 1970 to 2000 as large scale 
patterns such as deindustrialization and suburbanization shaped the economy and social 
organization of the region. The distribution curves for population loss became more negative as 
the gap between 1970 and the comparison year increased as is shown in Table 10. The minimum 
value decreased as the gap increased as did the means and medians. Each of these distributions 
was distorted by extreme positive outliers: a handful of tracts had significant gains in population 
for each year including the largest growth in tract population of more than 400%. This long positive 
tail elevates the skewness and kurtosis figures even though a large majority of tracts (83% in 1980, 
88% in 1990, and 90% in 2000) had not seen an increase in population from 1970. This general 
trend matches the outmigration from the cities towards outer ring suburbs and out of the region. 
The percent of the population that was Black increased over time and the distribution curves shifted 
positively yet there remained a large portion of tracts with few Black people especially considering 
that by 2000, 23.8% of those living in these tracts were Black. This reflects the high level of 
residential segregation within the Pittsburgh region. Residential segregation did decrease each 
decade from 1970 and 2000 which is reflected by the rising measures of central tendency but also 
the declining levels of kurtosis as the density of the distribution became more even.  
In each decade, poverty was concentrated in a few tracts. Each distribution has a large 
positive tail and many of the tracts are concentrated at relatively low levels of poverty. From 1970 
to 1990, the kurtosis measured fairly high and increased marginally with time but dropped a fair 
amount by 2000. From 1970 to 1990, the mean and maximum value increased similarly yet the 
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kurtosis increased only slightly suggesting that while poverty levels were rising the geographic 
dispersion of poverty remained proportional. In 2000, however, the maximum value and kurtosis 
dropped yet the mean increased suggesting that poverty became more dispersed throughout the 
city.  The income figures are not adjusted for inflation so it is meaningless to compare the means 
and medians directly across decades. Yet, it is important to note that each distribution was 
positively skewed for each decade meaning that a few tracts had the highest incomes.  
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
’70 to ‘00 Percent 
Change in Pop. -0.2536 -0.2989 -0.9103 4.0743 0.3782 6.9228 72.877 
’70 to ’90 Percent 
Change in Pop. -0.2030 -0.2514 -0.7674 4.28 0.3603 8.1593 96.512 
’70 to ’80 Percent 
Change in Pop. -0.1076 -0.1572 -0.6977 4.4819 0.3810 8.3476 92.326 
‘70 Percent Black 0.1275 0.0139 0 0.9865 0.2453 2.2552 6.9624 
‘80 Percent Black 0.1643 0.0230 0 0.9918 0.2817 1.8620 5.0886 
‘90 Percent Black 0.1911 0.0338 0 0.9907 0.2978 1.6156 4.2037 
‘00 Percent Black 0.2345 0.0706 0 0.9819 0.3099 1.3156 3.2191 
‘70 Poverty Rate 0.1161 0.0870 0 0.5082 0.0964 1.8851 6.6818 
‘80 Poverty Rate 0.1279 0.0904 0.0034 0.6404 0.1185 1.9098 6.8115 
‘90 Poverty Rate 0.1668 0.1122 0 0.8539 0.1600 1.9142 6.9958 
‘00 Poverty Rate 0.1697 0.1229 0 0.7009 0.1420 1.5453 5.2161 
‘70 Avg. Income 11,618 10,304 4,000.9 39,212 4,949.6 2.6636 12.367 
‘80 Avg. Income 22,986 21,015 6,862.9 89,612 9,738.9 2.5791 13.756 
‘90 Avg. Income 39,776 34,537 0 195,210 22,807 2.7689 14.930 
’00 Avg. Income 56,263 48,498 0 302,850 33,906 3.1757 18.592 
Table 10 Descriptive Statistics for Population Variables, 1970-2000 
The descriptive statistics calculated for housing from 1970 to 2000 are listed in Table 15 
in Appendix A. Occupancy rates in the study area decreased over time. This makes sense given 
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the significant population loss in the region over the same time period. From 1970 to 2000, 
occupancy rates fluctuated which suggests that some parts of the city lost more occupants, or that 
some areas of the city didn’t lose as many housing units despite population loss. Conversely, 
abandonment increased in the city. In 1970, abandonment in the city was concentrated in small 
pockets of the city judging by how low the mean and median were and how heavy the positive tail 
was according to the skewness and the kurtosis. By 1980 and 1990, abandonment occurred more 
generally in the city as the mean, median, and maximum value increased and yet the kurtosis and 
skewness dropped significantly. In 2000, while the maximum value was far larger than it had been 
previously, the impact of the outlier was far less pronounced than it had been in 1970 because 
abandonment was more generally occurring than in 1970. Abandonment became more common 
but it did not become a general pattern across the city, the minimum value was within a standard 
deviation of the mean for each decade suggesting that even while abandonment became less 
pocketed with time a large portion of the variance was driven by those areas that were affected by 
abandonment.  
Ownership maintained a similar distribution from decade to decade but there was a wide, 
consistent variance across the city of ownership rates in each decade. The ownership rate for Black 
people was calculated out of the number of housing units occupied primarily by a Black person, 
thus the sample size of tracts is significantly lower than for the other variables because of 
residential segregation in 1970. As time went on the number of tracts in the sample increased to 
240 out of the 262 total tracts. As the number of tracts increased, the mean and median dropped 
perhaps suggesting that the way many people of color gained access to a portion of these tracts 
was by renting homes rather than buying them. As with income, it is difficult to draw meaningful 
comparisons between the distributions of the average values of owner occupied homes because the 
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figures are unadjusted for inflation. The number of tracts in the sample is slightly less than 262 
because several tracts in the study area did not have a specified owner occupant which is a subset 
of responses. About 30,000 units that were built before 1940 were demolished between 1970 and 
1980. A few tracts were excluded for this analysis. 136 The distribution of the demolition rate was 
negatively skewed with many tracts losing very few units but some tracts losing a large portion. 
The distribution of the percentage of units built before 1940 shifted slightly negatively from 1970 
to 1980. 
6.2.2 Population Characteristics 
The 1937 HOLC map’s grading patterns are associated with persistent neighborhood demographic 
characteristics from 1970 to 2000. Yellow or red areas had a disproportionate number of tracts 
with persistently large proportions of people of color. Redlined areas had 46 persistent tracts 
compared to 6 persistent tracts in blue or green areas. Persistent tracts were those that were at the 
extreme end—beyond a standard deviation from the mean—in each of the four census years. This 
relationship failed a chi-squared test of independence (p-value=0.000). The results of the 
independence tests for demographic variables are summarized in Table 11. The full frequency 
tables for each test are provided in Appendix A. Like when the maps were originally drawn, many 
disproportionately Black communities are in historically redlined areas. Figure 11 shows that there 
are three main clusters of tracts that were persistently Black: one in the North Side in the 
Manchester area, another centered in the Hill District, and a third in ranging from Larimer to 
                                                 
136 The NCDB relies on a series of weights to assign count data from the 1970 and 1980 Censuses to 1990 census 
blocks (see Appendix J of the NCDB). As with any weighted estimate, there is a degree of risk that data will be 
misappropriated. Roughly 1% of housing units built before 1940 recorded in the 1970 Census were shown as 
increases in the 1980 Census. Tracts showing an increase were excluded from the analysis. 
 91 
Homewood. Each of these clusters are largely coved by red areas with some portion of yellow area 
as well. There were no tracts that were persistently white. Because the standard deviation included 
the range between the mean and the minimum, tracts were flagged if they were in the upper 90% 
of the distribution for percent white. No tracts were in the upper 90% of the distribution for all 
four censuses. 
Variable Relationship p-value 
Persistently Black Concentrated in red/yellow 0.000 
Persistently High Poverty Concentrated in red/yellow 0.001 
Persistently High Income Concentrated in green/blue 0.000 
Persistently Low Income Proportionate, small sample 0.502 
Table 11 Summary of Independence Tests for Demographic Variables, 1970-2000 
Tracts with persistently high levels of poverty were also associated with the yellow or red 
areas of the map. Of the 26 tracts with persistently and relatively high levels of poverty, 24 tracts 
were in yellow or red areas. The relationship between the grade and tracts with persistently high 
poverty had a statistically significant association (p-value=0.001). Tracts with persistently high 
poverty are those that had poverty rates a standard deviation above the mean for each of the four 
census years. There is a cluster of persistently poor tracts in the Hill District (see Figure 12). 
Conversely, tracts with persistently high average incomes were associated with blue and green 
areas; 32 such tracts were in blue or green areas compared with 10 such tracts in red or yellow 
areas. The relationship between income and grade was statistically significant (p-value=0.000). 
Tracts were considered to have persistently high incomes if their average income was beyond a 
standard deviation from the mean in each of the four census years. There were only two areas with 
persistently high incomes from 1970 to 2000 in Pittsburgh—Downtown and Squirrel Hill—the 
remainder of tracts were in the suburbs (see Figure 13). Urban renewal programs and public private 
partnerships from the 1950’s redeveloped the ‘Golden Triangle’ in Downtown replacing the 
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deterioration observed by the appraisers of the 1930’s into a functioning affluent community. 
While those tracts that had consistently higher incomes than the rest of the city were concentrated 
in blue or green areas, the few tracts that consistently had the lowest incomes were spread 
proportionately across the grades. Only nine tracts had persistent low incomes and seven of those 
were in redlined areas. 
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Figure 11 Persistently Black Tracts and Security Grade, 1970-2000
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Figure 12 Persistently High Poverty Tracts and Security Grade, 1970-2000
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Figure 13 Persistently High Income Tracts and Security Grade, 1970-2000
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The association between persistent neighborhood characteristics and the Residential 
Security Map are important findings. Housing markets in Pittsburgh that were historically 
considered to be the least valuable and most dangerous for investment, partially because they were 
home to people of color and the poor, are still more likely to be home to the same populations. 
Tracts that are selected are consistently more extreme than the rest of the distribution in each of 
four consecutive censuses. Conditions in these tracts are persistent and their alignment with the 





(Red, Yellow) 95% CI 
Mean     
(Green, 
Blue) 
95% CI p-value 
1980 -0.1229 -0.1639 -0.0819 -0.0820 -0.1354 -0.0285 0.1182 
1990 -0.2291 -0.2670 -0.1913 -0.1513 -0.2045 -0.0981 0.0088 
2000 -0.2896 -0.3267 -0.2505 -0.1970 -0.2498 -0.1442 0.0028 
Table 12 Difference of Means Test of Population Change by Security Grade, 1970-2000 
While the entire region experienced population loss from 1950 to 2000, different areas 
experienced the outmigration differently. In the third consecutive, and single largest, decade of 
population loss, the graded regions did not lose population at statistically distinct rates. Yet, the 
long-term population loss between 1970 and 1990 and 1970 and 2000 was more pronounced in 
redlined communities than in blue or green areas (see Table 12). This is, perhaps, largely driven 
by the mill communities that were in red and yellow areas. These areas were largely working class 
and largely dependent on the mills for work. When the steel industry collapsed in 1982-83, these 
communities were particularly affected. Neighborhoods in green and blue areas were home to 
more professionals who were more tied to the administrative, education, medical, and financial 
jobs that were more consistent in Pittsburgh. The graph of population change over time shows how 
red and yellow tracts lost population at similar rates but green tracts have had consistent population 
over time (see Figure 14). In 1970, blue, yellow, and red areas lost population at a somewhat 
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similar rate but by 1980, blue areas lost population at a slower rate than yellow or red areas which 
kept losing population similarly. Communities that had been historically redlined were more 
vulnerable to sustained population loss than communities that had not been. 
 
Figure 14 Change in Population by Security Grade, 1970-2000 
6.2.3 Housing Conditions 
Housing patterns, consistent from 1970 to 2000, were associated with the grading patterns of the 
1937 Residential Security Map. Communities with consistently low occupancy rates (and thus 
higher vacancy rates) were disproportionately located in redlined communities (p-value=0.006). 
The summary of results from housing tests of independence is provided in Table 13. The full 
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consistently at the lower tail of the distribution, they were exclusively located in redlined 
communities. While 13 places out of 514 does not represent a significant occurrence, the pattern 
between redlined and non-redlined communities is stark. At the other end of occupancy spectrum, 
there were no tracts which were consistently beyond a standard deviation from the rest of the tracts; 
this is not surprising given how the distributions are concentrated towards the maximum. Also, 
only one tract had consistently high levels of abandonment over the three decades. Vacancy and 
abandonment generally were not persistently associated with grade but the presence of low 
occupancy areas exclusively in redlined areas is a noteworthy finding. 
Variable Relationship p-value 
Persistent Low Occupancy Exclusively in red/yellow 0.006 
Persistent Low Ownership Proportionately frequent 0.204 
Persistent High Ownership Disproportionately in green/blue 0.002 
Persistent High Black Ownership Disproportionately in green/blue 0.001 
Persistent High Value Concentrated in green/blue 0.000 
Table 13 Summary of Independence Tests for Housing Variables, 1970-2000 
Home ownership, an indicator of community stability, was associated with the parts of the 
Pittsburgh that were graded either green or blue. Areas with consistently large portions of renters 
were evenly distributed across grades; there was not a significant association between grade and 
communities of largely renters (p-value=0.204). Of the 51 tracts that persistently had large portions 
of units occupied by home owners, a disproportionate amount of those tracts were located in first 
and second grade areas. Given the difference in sample sizes, an independent variable would occur 
roughly twice as frequently in redlined areas than in not redlined areas. Tracts with persistent high 
home ownership occurred more often in tracts that were not redlined and the chi-squared test of 
independence confirms an association between the historic redlining status of a tract and the large 
prevalence of homeowners (p-value=0.002). Further, tracts that had persistent large portions of 
Black homeowners were disproportionately located in green and blue areas: the association is 
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statistically significant (p-value=0.001). Tracts with large portions of rental units were 
proportionately spread across the grades; there was not a statistically significant association 
between the historic grade and tracts with traditions of rental units (p-value=0.204).  No tracts had 
rental rates for Black that were persistently below a standard deviation from the mean. That is not 
surprising considering the significant shift in the distribution of Black homeownership over time.  
Communities in Pittsburgh that have consistently had average home values higher than the 
rest of the city are disproportionately located in areas that were not redlined. Of the 55 tracts that 
had persistently valuable homes, 41 were in either green or blue areas. The relationship between 
home value and the history of redlining was statistically significant (p-value=0.000). Similarly, to 
the tracts with persistently the highest incomes, tracts with the highest average value were either 
clustered in North Oakland, Shadyside, and Squirrel Hill or were in the suburbs (see Figure 15). 
On the other side of this relationship, no tracts had average home values at the bottom end of the 
distribution in all four censuses.  
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Figure 15 Persistently High Value Tracts and Security Grade, 1970-2000 
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Housing patterns were most persistent in the historically green and blue areas of the city. 
These communities had more stable, positive conditions over the forty-year period than the rest of 
the city and were consistently in the upper portion of the distribution of housing conditions in the 
city. Areas of the city that were historically graded as the best real estate markets continue to have 
significant traditions of high home ownership, including for people of color, and the highest 
housing values. The relationship between these markets and their historic grade are all significant. 
6.2.4 Precarious Condition of Old Units 
Housing units have enough permanence to physically reflect the economic and social context of a 
neighborhood over time. Disinvestment leaves physical legacies on the built as well as social 
geography. Housing units in redlined areas were far more likely to be demolished between 1940 
and 1970 than units that were not redlined: 45,712 units were demolished in redlined areas, a 
28.28% decrease, compared to the 2,674 units in areas that were not redlined, a 4.49% reduction. 
As Figure 16 shows, the tracts that lost the most units were scattered throughout the city aside 
from two small clusters—the North Shore/Strip District and from East Liberty to Homewood along 
Penn. Despite the significant reduction of housing units in redlined areas, old units were still more 
prevalent in red and yellow areas than in blue and green areas. In 1970, on average, 67.5% of units 
in red and yellow areas were built before 1940 compared to 57.9% of units in blue and green areas. 
As shown in Table 14, the difference in means is statistically significant (p-value=0.000). Between 
1970 and 1980, more homes were demolished; through 1980, redlined areas continued to have old 
homes demolished at higher rates than areas that were not redlined. The difference in demolition 
rates between grades is statistically significant (p-value=0.0150). Yet, again in 1980, like 1970, 
redlined areas had significantly greater portions of their housing stock built before 1940 (70.6% 
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compared to 56.9%). The disparities in the housing stock reflect disparities in investment and 
stability between grades. Homes that were denied investment and could not be maintained would 
become uninhabitable and then be demolished. Redlined areas were also more likely to have urban 
renewal or public housing developments that razed sections of neighborhoods and this destruction 
possibly drove a large portion of the demolition.  
 Mean 
(Red, Yellow) 95% CI 
Mean     
(Green, Blue) 95% CI p-value 
’70 Percent 
Old Units 0.6748 0.6483 0.7013 0.5787 0.5438 0.6136 0.0000 
Demolition 
Rate ’70-‘80 -0.1171 -0.0857 -0.1485 -0.0585 -0.0152 -0.1017 0.0150 
’80 Percent 
Old Units 0.7064 0.6724 0.7404 0.5685 0.5297 0.6073 0.0000 
’70 Rental 
Rate 0.4339 0.4134 0.4606 0.3826 0.3494 0.4159 0.0040 
’70 Old Unit 
Rental Rate 0.7032 0.6781 0.7283 0.5992 0.5642 0.6341 0.0000 
Table 14 Difference of Means Test of Old Unit Variables by Security Grade, 1970-2000 
In 1970, red and yellow tracts had greater portions of rental units than green and blue tracts 
accommodating a less financially stable and perhaps more transient population (p-value=0.0040). 
Renters, regardless of the grade their neighborhood received, were likely to be living in a home 
built prior 1940; the average portion, across all grades, of renters living in units built before 1940 
was 66.7%. Yet, older structures were even more likely to be rented in areas that were redlined 
than those that were not (p-value=0.0000). Those who could not afford a home, or would not be 
sold one, were more likely to live in the oldest, and perhaps lower quality, housing in all grades 
but particularly in redlined areas. The Residential Security Map resembles patterns of 
disinvestment and demolition decades after it was made. 
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Figure 16 Tracts with Largest Loss of Old Units and Security Grade, 1970-1980 
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7.0  IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOLC FOR PITTSBURGH’S COMMUNITIES 
7.1 LEGACIES OF THE HOLC 
My assessment of Pittsburgh’s social and physical geography in 1940 confirms much of what is 
understood about the Residential Security Maps. The maps outlined districts with comparable 
housing quality and then ranked them. African-American communities were disproportionately 
included in red areas. The areas that received the lower grades also included sections of housing 
in the poorest condition and least value. The higher grades were more stable with much larger 
portions of homeownership. The wealth already established in green and blue areas in 1937 was 
likely preserved and augmented from the open access to investment that neighborhood appraisal 
concepts provided. Red areas were those that already received the least investment; they had the 
lowest quality homes and the most underserved populations. As time progressed, red and yellow 
areas experienced a disproportionate number of demolitions, an indication of the prolonged 
deterioration and disinvestment from these communities.  
From 1970 to 2000, Pittsburgh’s social geography resembled the 1937 map in profound 
ways and many of the historic disparities between grades persisted. Tracts that had the largest 
portions of Blacks were still strongly associated with red and yellow grades. These grades also 
included areas with the greatest concentrations of poverty. Conversely, high income communities 
were significantly associated with the first and second grades. This dynamic, one that has persisted 
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for three decades in modern Pittsburgh, was constructed in the 1930’s. The security maps did not 
only physically differentiate neighborhoods but reflected a conceptual framework inherent to 
neighborhood appraisal. The conceptual dynamic that differentiated green and blue areas, wealthy 
areas, from red and yellow ones, which were poorer, existed whether someone saw the map or not.  
The housing patterns of modern Pittsburgh also align with the Residential Security Map. 
Judging by the concentration of high levels of home ownership and the most valuable homes in 
green and blue areas, sections of modern Pittsburgh that likely have the highest quality homes, are 
the most stable, and are the most valued held the same status in 1937. The status of these 
communities, relative to their peers, was forged in the early 20th century and reinforced by the 
1930’s. The continued access to investment and the demand for these communities relative to other 
areas of Pittsburgh, maintained the value of homes through time. Average home values in blue and 
green areas were much higher than other parts of the city in 1940 and the same is true in modern 
Pittsburgh.  
The persistence of Pittsburgh’s social geography and its alignment with the Residential 
Security Map is notable and suggest that many of the city’s neighborhoods are consistent in both 
their character and relationship to one another; the historic hierarchy of neighborhood status still 
exists in modern Pittsburgh. The entrenchment of largely Black or largely poor tracts in places that 
had been devalued and, at least at one time, had the lowest quality homes is remarkable. While the 
debate about the influence of the HOLC maps is important, the extent to which Pittsburgh’s social 
geography has been maintained and still resembles the Residential Security Map, even after six 
decades, is a significant finding in and of itself. The fact that population patterns and stratification 
of the 1930’s are still present in modern Pittsburgh—despite a host of other macro- and meso- 
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policies and trends over a sixty year period—suggests an alarming permanence to some 
neighborhood conditions and disparities which have not been addressed.  
Neighborhoods that were graded either first or second grade have preserved their status 
over time. Contrary to the position taken by Burgess, Babcock, Hoyt, and the FHLBB, housing 
did not necessarily follow a standard depreciation with time and filtration through lower economic 
classes. Communities that benefitted from sustained investment and market interest over time 
maintained their prime position in the housing market. These communities still receive a 
disproportionate volume of lending in 2015: seven neighborhoods (Squirrel Hill North and South, 
Shadyside, Point Breeze, Highland Park, Brookline, and South Side Flats) received fifty percent 
of the total mortgage dollars lent in the city.137 Six of these communities were graded either green 
or blue and the seventh, South Side Flats, has had a tremendous amount of investment since the 
redevelopment of the former Jones and Laughlin steel mill site. The upper tier of housing 
communities, those with the highest home ownership and value, has persisted from the 1937 to 
1970, through to 2000, and even to 2015.  
The traditional narrative about redlining and the neighborhood equality fits this pattern: as 
mortgage lenders generally ceased activity in redlined communities, opportunities for 
homeownership disappeared and those who could afford to move did. Disproportionate levels of 
poverty and a concentration of people of color already existed in these communities but became 
entrenched and persistent through time. Other communities were consistently understood by 
lenders to be sound investments and these housing markets functioned with sustained demand and 
mortgage access over time. Those who could afford a home—or would be sold to—could live in 
                                                 
137 Rachel Rue, 21st Annual Mortgage Lending Study, (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group, 
2015), 13. 
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these communities and generate wealth. The status of these communities became defined over time 
and manifested in an entrenched and persistent gap. But, the practices of the private industry and 
the trajectories of various neighborhoods are not the primary concern of this paper. The 
fundamental question is what was the influence of the FHLBB and the HOLC? 
What is known is that the FHLBB, via the HOLC, developed their own application of 
neighborhood appraisal while in conversation with the numerous government agencies, trade 
associations, and real estate experts about neighborhood appraisal practice. The FHLBB published 
their methods in their journal, Federal Home Loan Bank Review, which was sent to each of its 
partner lending institutions, a network they amassed while helping HOLC to refinance a fifth of 
the homes in the entire country. The FHLBB undertook an effort to assess the housing markets of 
over two hundred cities—the City Survey Program. The FHLBB relied on local advisors to survey 
submarkets within the city and compiled two reports, a public summary file and a confidential 
internal file that included the residential security map. The public file was circulated to banks while 
the confidential file was only sent to government agencies and the HOLC district offices.  
A liberal interpretation would argue that the FHLBB and HOLC did influence lenders 
towards neighborhood appraisal and the development of redlining maps. The FHLBB’s 
normalization, legitimatization and proliferation of neighborhood appraisal methods hastened the 
divestment from areas commonly understood to be dangerous—those outlined in red or yellow on 
the map. The FHLBB was not an instigator, insofar, as they did not introduce racial and class 
biases into the real estate industry but the FHLBB was a partner in that normalized prejudice in 
lending, developed their own security mapping application and published the methodology of that 
system in their trade journal, widely circulated to partner banking institutions. New Deal housing 
programs, like the FHLBB and the HOLC, were asserting unprecedented federal authority on the 
 108 
housing market due to the Great Depression. Lenders were certainly paying attention to the actions 
of the federal government: when the FHLBB—which had helped rescue many of these lenders just 
a few years prior—endorsed a novel technique to insure safety of mortgage investments, a banking 
product that had just been revolutionized, mortgage lenders listened to the FHLBB. They 
developed residential security maps of their community, either physical or conceptual, and made 
lending decisions accordingly. Under this framework, the Residential Security Map is either a 
prototype or a cousin to the maps that lenders developed in their offices or in their minds. 
A conservative interpretation of the HOLC would argue that the lenders did not pay 
attention to the advice of the FHLBB. Yes, the lenders were operating in a changing housing 
market but they ignored the government’s advocacy. Many of the neighborhood appraisal practices 
that the HOLC would adopt and further develop originated within the industry and were practiced 
by the industry regardless of the government’s actions or endorsement. The conservative would 
consider the map to be an assessment of a city at a given point in time, created with a certain rubric 
that was similar to the ideas circulating among the industry yet in no way representative of 
industry’s behavior.  
My assessment of the legacy of the HOLC confirms a significant association between 
numerous neighborhood characteristics and the historic grading of the Residential Security Map. 
Both the number of characteristics that were persistent through time and the significant association 
between those patterns and the Residential Security Map reflect a relationship between 
Pittsburgh’s modern social geography and the Residential Security Map that is not accidental; the 
FHLBB’s endorsement and legitimatization of the biased neighborhood appraisal standards helped 
to maintain differential access to lending in Pittsburgh. This differential access entrenched 
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neighborhood conditions and preserved a stratification of neighborhoods, resulting in a persistent 
gap. 
7.2 WHAT IS UNEXPLAINED? 
The Residential Security Maps are an artifact of neighborhood appraisal techniques in the 1930’s 
that were pioneered by the FHLBB, FHA, and private industry. It is clear that the conceptualization 
of neighborhood ideology has had persistent effects that have maintained the historic stratification 
and segregation of the 1930’s into modern Pittsburgh; there is a significant association between 
the application of ideology in the map of Pittsburgh and the modern social geography of the city. 
It is reasonable that differential access to investment would reproduce disparities, yet, one would 
expect that after some time, larger forces would begin to have effects that would change the map 
and the association would diminish. Even if lenders continued to behave similarly, they would be 
behaving per the shifting social geography. As urban renewal and public housing displaced 
thousands and suburbanization, deindustrialization and other large-scale changes reorganized the 
city, theoretically, the geography would change yet Pittsburgh’s did not. What is not understood, 
but is critical to this question, is what forces maintained this geography even beyond the 
Community Reinvestment Act in 1977—which meant to differential access to mortgages and 
correct the imbalance in lending. The GIS-based framework that I developed can only assess the 
relationship between the Residential Security Map and more modern neighborhood conditions and 
cannot evaluate and compare the factors that may have maintained the stratification.  
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7.3 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The Geographic Information System created for this analysis is an appropriate basis and starting 
point for further research. One pressing question that this project raises is what happened to 
Pittsburgh communities between 1940 and 1970? Another project could fill in the gap between the 
map’s construction and the NCDB which begins in 1970. Allegheny County had been entirely 
covered by Census tracts from 1940 onwards and each Census could be standardized and 
normalized to more thoroughly track Pittsburgh communities through time. Another open question 
concerns the complicity of other government programs in segregation and other neighborhood 
inequalities. Data from the Pittsburgh Housing Authority, the URA, and other government 
agencies could be added to the GIS to explore how developments affected different places in the 
city  and, particularly, to assess how government programs worked in conjunction or in conflict 
with one another. It would also be useful to assess some of the assumptions of this project. For 
instance, mortgage data is stored in the County Recorder’s office. This data exists, at least, after 
the passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975. Digitizing and geo-referencing this 
data could assess the degree to which redlining practices in the 1970’s and 1980’s resembled the 
Residential Security grades from 1937. Additionally, the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County 
are making government data much more available through the Western Pennsylvania Regional 
Data Clearinghouse. A project could assess whether other measures of housing quality—
demolitions, code violations, house fires—resemble the Residential Security Map; what are some 
unexpected but nonetheless revealing relationships? Lastly, the Residential Security Maps have 
recently been georeferenced and published online. This project could be expanded to other cities 
to assess whether the Residential Security Maps are similarly representative of modern conditions 
in those cities. 
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7.4 WAS THE GOVERNMENT COMPLICIT IN SEGREGATION? 
The modern debate in urban studies over the legacy of the Residential Security Maps, and by 
extension the HOLC, the FHLBB, and the federal government, is founded in Kenneth Jackson’s 
contention that the Residential Security Maps (and the federal government) were complicit in the 
segregation of American cities. Amy Hillier provided the sharpest contradiction of this argument, 
highlighting fundamental flaws about the timeline and feasibility of such a massive conspiracy and 
argued that the HOLC was, with some notable exceptions, an equal lender. According to my 
research, the HOLC itself was not complicit. However, The FHLBB published the City Survey 
Program’s methodology and advocated neighborhood appraisal methods that explicitly warned 
about the danger African Americans and the poor posed to investment security. The FHLBB 
normalized and legitimatized appraisal methods that certainly supported segregation; stable, 
integrated communities could not develop if the presence of a few people of color represented the 
precipitous decline of the community in the eyes of lenders.  
The racial prejudices that were woven into neighborhood appraisal ideology have persisted 
and influenced lending decisions for decades, even beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.138 The Residential Security Maps, the City Survey 
Program and the HOLC were primarily concerned with housing in the older, urban cores of 
American cities. The complicity debate involves a much broader range of government programs 
involving the subsidization of suburbanization, urban renewal, and public housing, among others. 
The Residential Security Maps are an aspect of the broader debate, although, the FHLBB’s 
                                                 
138 Dedman, “Atlanta Blacks Losing in Home Loans Scramble,” A1. 
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participation in neighborhood appraisal represents a degree of complicity and is perhaps indicative 
of participation in other segregationist systems.  
In Pittsburgh, communities with persistently large portions of African-American residents 
were significantly more likely to have been historically devalued by appraisers. The 
conceptualization of these spaces, developed by neighborhood appraisal techniques, among both 
financiers and the general public, reinforce prejudices, discrimination, and segregation. These 
spaces, being historically redlined, are more likely to have greater prevalence of renters and 
housing units, reflecting, perhaps, less stable communities and lower-quality, outdated homes. 
Because neighborhood appraisal suppressed the economic value of African-American 
communities, whiter communities had both greater capacity to generate wealth and priority access 
to investment. Persistent African-American communities in Pittsburgh, facing negative 
conceptualizations of space, less stable communities, and uneven access to wealth, likely remain 
encumbered by the legacies of the neighborhood appraisal as advocated by the federal government. 
7.5 CONSEQUENCES FOR URBAN HOUSING 
The ecological model influenced the stasis of Pittsburgh’s social geography because it informed 
the conceptualization of Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods in the 1930’s. The City Survey Program’s 
perspective on neighborhood development was highly influenced by the descriptions of the 
ecology model and operationalized the descriptions as criteria for measuring investment security. 
The rationale for assigning security grades developed from estimating their neighborhoods stage 
in its life cycle. Young, developing neighborhoods were given the highest marks while red and 
yellow areas were those that were considered to have reached an irredeemable stage in their life, 
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their nadir. The appraisers also drew on the ecology model’s rhetoric of filtering, infiltration and 
invasion of different populations and land uses. The HOLC was not an intervention for urban 
neighborhoods but one for housing markets; real estate ideology of the time held that neighborhood 
decline was the inevitable and even natural progression of housing. Yet, the conceptualization of 
neighborhood appraisal fostered and maintained consistency. Pittsburgh’s experience of persistent 
neighborhood disparities illustrates the capacity of models and ideology to produce and maintain 
the conditions that they describe.  
 Most of the twentieth century explanations that were discussed do not account for the 
ideological construction of space and seem to have limited applicability to Pittsburgh’s entrenched 
conditions. Ecological development, gentrification, and the rent gap each present a dynamic 
progression of neighborhood investment that either deteriorates steadily or is renewed by the 
movement of either people or capital. These models explain other phenomenon in the city since 
the 1930’s. The ecology model and the rent gap model do explain the larger economic changes 
that surround Pittsburgh; both models provide explanations for the expansion of investment and 
suburbanization surrounding the city. The rent gap model explains the loss of manufacturing jobs 
as heavy industry made capital investments elsewhere and moved production facilities out of the 
city. The gentrification and the rent gap model can certainly explain changes in Pittsburgh 
neighborhoods since 2000, namely South Side Flats, Lawrenceville, and East Liberty. Yet none of 
these three models explain Pittsburgh’s stasis.  
The most applicable theory to Pittsburgh’s experience is the political economy approach. 
Bartelt’s argument that the social history of a space drives development patterns resonates with 
the maintained hierarchy of Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods. A handful of neighborhoods which 
historically benefitted from access to investment still have the highest average incomes, rates of 
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home ownership, and average home values and continue to receive a disproportionate volume of 
mortgages.139 These communities continue to embody historic conceptions of value and status that 
were reflected in their green and blue grades. Communities with greater constituencies of poor or 
Black residents are aligned with those places that were considered of the lowest value and were 
historically home to communities of immigrants and people of color. The association between 
historic and modern conditions supports a notion that social histories can drive investment. 
7.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT 
The New Deal was the beginning of an interventionist, egalitarian moment in American politics. 
But, the HOLC, as a lender, was not created with a populist, egalitarian agenda: it was designed 
as a market intervention. To correct a contracted housing market, the government introduced funds 
for lenders and stable mortgages for borrowers—a win-win. The FHLBB began the City Survey 
Program to help administer these loans and assess the market conditions of American cities. The 
FHLBB joined a conversation about neighborhood appraisal that legitimatized divestment from 
poor and Black communities and maintained investment in wealthier, whiter areas. The gap and 
the stratification among urban neighborhoods became entrenched over time. Despite six decades 
of macro-level changes and government interventions, large and small, Pittsburgh remains a 
segregated and divided city with deep social histories in each of its communities.  
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Today, the United States is in a neoliberal political moment that values a transfer from 
government intervention to even greater market determination.140 Urban geographic disparities, 
shaped by the government interventions during a previous, and more egalitarian, phase of political 
thought, have only been maintained. In his work, The Neoliberal City, Jason Hackworth 
conceptualizes that in the 1980’s and 1990’s capital was reorganized away from manufacturing 
and suburbanization industries and had “switched into finance, insurance, and real estate.”141 This 
reorganization is coupled with reinvestment in cities and disinvestment from inner suburban 
communities. Government investment has historically been a significant contributor to urban 
economic growth and development by providing direction or structure to the subsequent capital 
investment and growth.142 As neoliberal policies cut social services—undermining the capacity of 
underserved communities—and create tax incentives for development, investment is likely to be 
more motivated to capitalize rent gaps that exist in poor communities. Urban communities are 
likely to be more vulnerable to gentrification and displacement as capital, with a renewed urban 
interest, exploits a geography of uneven development.143 
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
The FHLBB created the City Survey Program, which was administered by HOLC, to assess the 
condition of the housing market in over 200 cities. Assessors in each city talked to lenders, 
surveyed neighborhoods and collected data about the broader region and economy. They compiled 
their findings into a public summary file and a confidential internal file that included a Residential 
Security Map. The Residential Security Map was constructed from Area Description Sheets which 
graded not only the housing and market conditions but the quality of the population according to 
harsh and prejudiced criteria. The FHLBB’s interest in grading neighborhood quality and 
investment security occurred amid a conceptualization of neighborhood appraisal among real 
estate experts, driven by both private industry and the government. The FHLBB was an active, 
vocal participant in that conversation, publishing the methodology of the Residential Security 
Maps in their trade journal. In this way, even though the maps themselves were not public, they 
were a contribution to the development of neighborhood appraisal. Local experts had a strong 
degree of influence and each map weighted factors differently from city to city. The maps are an 
apt reflection of localized thinking and practices in the time and space they were created. The 
Residential Security Maps are useful artifacts to explore the local real estate industry of a given 
city in the late 1930’s. 
 To assess the legacies of the real estate industry’s conceptualization of Pittsburgh, I used 
a GIS-based analysis to measure the association between modern neighborhood conditions and the 
1937 Residential Security Map for Pittsburgh. The map was first digitally reconstructed and then 
intersected with the 1940 and 2000 censuses. The 1940 Census was an appropriate proxy to assess 
the grading of the 1937 map and evaluate how grades compared to one another on a range of 
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demographic and housing characteristics. The Neighborhood Change Database, which 
standardized the 1970, 1980, and 1990 census tracts to the 2000 census tract map, was used to 
observe long term persistence of a range of variables in a constant space. Demographic variables, 
such as race, poverty, and income, and housing variables, such as ownership, occupancy, and 
value, were assessed. Tracts that were beyond a standard deviation from the mean of the 
distribution in each year were flagged and, if flagged in all four years, were considered to represent 
persistence. These tracts were then tabulated by their historic residential security grade and 
statistical tests were performed to assess the relationship between persistence and the grade. 
Additional assessments of redlining’s impact on units built prior to 1940 explored differences in 
the housing stock between grades. 
My assessment of the 1940 Census confirmed that the Residential Security Maps 
disproportionately included immigrant and Black communities in red grades. Additionally, 
communities that received lower grades had more renters, lower-value homes, worse quality 
structures, and more crowding. The Residential Security Map outlined stark divisions between 
neighborhoods in Pittsburgh and categorized the stratification by grade. In contemporary 
Pittsburgh, tracts with persistent communities of color and those with high poverty were 
overwhelmingly located in red and yellow grades while tracts with the highest incomes were in 
green and blue areas. The persistence of racial and economic segregation in Pittsburgh and its 
alignment with areas that have a history, and perhaps modern reality, of disinvestment is an 
alarming finding. Housing characteristics were also sharply associated with grade as those tracts 
with the highest ownership rates, ownership rates among people of color, and average home values 
were concentrated in areas that had graded green and blue. Also, tracts that were graded red and 
yellow had far more homes demolished between 1940 and 1970 and between 1970 and 1980 and 
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yet still had greater portions of their housing stock built before 1940 than green and blue areas. 
Further, there were more renters, on average, and old homes were more likely to be rented in red 
and yellow areas than green and blue areas. Green and blue areas benefitted from historic 
investment and continue to be more stable communities with likely better quality homes.  
The FHLBB and HOLC normalized and legitimatized neighborhood appraisal techniques 
that understood African Americans and the poor as threats to investment. The HOLC applied these 
techniques in the construction of the Residential Security Maps. Many have argued that the 
physical maps were the guide that precipitated divestment and discrimination but this claim doesn’t 
hold up to scrutiny.144 However, the maps are an appropriate reflection of real estate ideology in 
the 1930’s, which rationalized discrimination and precipitated disinvestment from certain urban 
communities.145 In Pittsburgh, investment practices buttressed the stark disparities in housing 
quality that already existed and calcified the stratification of neighborhoods—real estate ideology 
produced the conditions it described. The persistence of disparities is measurable in variables over 
time and reflects a city that is divided, geographically, along historic patterns of inequality. 
Historic, uneven investment, supported by the federal government constructed disparities in 
modern Pittsburgh. 
Pittsburgh’s transition from a largely industrial economy to one oriented around education, 
medicine, and technology has unequal promise for Pittsburghers split by education, race, and class. 
In an eight year period, the Pittsburgh area lost 120,000 manufacturing jobs and half of those were 
in basic steel. 146 The shock of the transition left many in Pittsburgh, but particularly African 
                                                 
144 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier; Hiller, “Who Received Loans?”; Hillier, “Redlining and the HOLC.”; Crossney 
and Bartelt “Residential Security, Risk, and Race” and “Legacies of the HOLC.” 
145 Stark, “Neighborhood Protection.” 
146 Trotter and Day, Race and Renaissance, 142, 146. 
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Americans, unemployed and unprepared for the new economy. The renewal and recent economic 
growth in Pittsburgh is concentrated among some of the population; the economic gap between 
white and African-American households expanded from 1999 to 2011—median income for whites 
grew by 36.5% compared to 8.5% growth for African Americans.147 This divergence is occurring 
upon an already stratified and divided geography. The concentration of jobs, investment and 
development in only a few areas of the city is likely to further reinforce the divisions between more 
impoverished, Blacker communities and wealthier, whiter ones.148 
The persistence of Pittsburgh’s social geography over the course of six decades, the 
entrenched divides between communities, and the pessimistic prospects of widening gaps in the 
future is a disturbing indication of inequality in the city. The pattern is likely to be sustained—it 
has already endured for so long—but it is not just. While numerous interventions—Section 8 
vouchers and the Community Reinvestment Act among others—have attempted to change these 
patterns, they have been ineffective. Policies that aggressively and effectively integrate 
neighborhoods, deconcentrate wealth without displacing the poor, ensure long-term affordable 
housing, and involve those left out of economic growth in the new economy are needed to disrupt 






                                                 
147 Mallach, Alan, "The Uncoupling of the Economic City Increasing Spatial and Economic Polarization in 
American Older Industrial Cities," Urban Affairs Review (2014): 459. 







Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
‘70 
Occupancy 262 0.9574 0.9699 0.7982 1 0.0388 -1.928 6.958 
‘80 
Occupancy 262 0.9395 0.9541 0.5556 1 0.0509 -2.808 16.39 
‘90 
Occupancy 262 0.9197 0.9355 0.5913 1 0.0568 -1.817 8.614 
‘00 
Occupancy 262 0.8942 0.9246 0.2189 1 0.0923 -2.654 14.99 
‘70 
Abandoned 262 0.0072 0.0036 0 0.1547 0.0132 6.657 66.66 
‘80 
Abandoned 262 0.0230 0.0124 0 0.2222 0.0340 3.327 17.36 
‘90 
Abandoned 262 0.0307 0.0187 0 0.1808 0.0308 1.744 6.606 
‘00 
Abandoned 262 0.0498 0.0242 0 0.6865 0.0715 4.155 29.55 
‘70 
Ownership 262 0.5939 0.6135 0.0839 1 0.2223 -0.3689 2.507 
‘80 
Ownership 262 0.5648 0.5966 0 0.9769 0.2291 -0.4220 2.471 
‘90 
Ownership 262 0.5580 0.5943 0 1 0.2269 -0.3502 2.461 
‘00 
Ownership 262 0.5389 0.5533 0 1 0.2317 -0.2275 2.466 
‘70 Black 
Ownership 118 0.7311 0.8358 0.0930 1 0.2979 -0.5372 1.818 
‘80 Black 
Ownership 206 0.5865 0.6029 0 1 0.3746 -0.2249 1.560 
‘90  Black 
Ownership 214 0.3869 0.3282 0 1 0.3375 0.5488 2.099 
‘00 Black 
Ownership 240 0.3831 0.3433 0 1 0.3132 0.5905 2.400 
’70 Avg. 
Value 258 16,660 14,640 5,755 49,060 7,949 1.686 5.862 
‘80 Avg. 
Value 260 41,960 37,000 9,750 176,200 23,280 2.112 9.085 
‘90 Avg. 
Value 259 60,610 47,710 15,170 340,800 45,180 2.951 14.17 
’00 Avg. 
Value 259 89,370 69,080 20,000 491,200 66,590 2.800 12.96 
’70 Percent 





208 0.1943 0.1622 0 0.8809 0.1399 1.547 6.525 
’80 Percent 




254 0.6635 0.7359 0 1 0.2457 -0.8984 2.896 
Table 15 Descriptive Statistics for Housing Variables, 1970-2000 
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Table 16 Chi-Squared: Persistently Black Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
 
Table 17 Fischer’s Exact: Persistently High Poverty Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
 
Table 18 Chi-Squared: Persistently High Income Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
 
Table 19 Fischer’s Exact: Persistently Low Income Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  14.6127   Pr = 0.000
     Total         462         52         514 
                                             
         Y         285         46         331 
         N         177          6         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
              Persistently Black
   1-sided Fisher's exact =                 0.001
           Fisher's exact =                 0.001
     Total         488         26         514 
                                             
         Y         307         24         331 
         N         181          2         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
                    Poverty
               Persistently High
          Pearson chi2(1) =  32.8624   Pr = 0.000
     Total         472         42         514 
                                             
         Y         321         10         331 
         N         151         32         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
                    Incomes
               Persistently High
   1-sided Fisher's exact =                 0.321
           Fisher's exact =                 0.502
     Total         505          9         514 
                                             
         Y         324          7         331 
         N         181          2         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
                    Incomes
               Persistently Low
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Table 20 Fischer’s Exact: Persistently Low Occupancy Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
 
Table 21 Chi-Squared: Persistently Low Ownership Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
 
Table 22 Chi-Squared: Persistently High Ownership Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
 
 
Table 23 Chi-Squared: Persistently High Black Ownership Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
   1-sided Fisher's exact =                 0.003
           Fisher's exact =                 0.006
     Total         501         13         514 
                                             
         Y         318         13         331 
         N         183          0         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
                   Occupancy
                Persistent Low
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.6116   Pr = 0.204
     Total         460         54         514 
                                             
         Y         292         39         331 
         N         168         15         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
                   Ownership
                Persistent Low
          Pearson chi2(1) =   9.1973   Pr = 0.002
     Total         463         51         514 
                                             
         Y         308         23         331 
         N         155         28         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
                   Ownership
                Persistent High
          Pearson chi2(1) =  11.7938   Pr = 0.001
     Total         457         57         514 
                                             
         Y         306         25         331 
         N         151         32         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
                   Ownership
             Persistent High Black
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Table 24 Chi-Squared: Persistently High Value Tracts by Redlined Status, 1970-2000 
 
 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  40.7384   Pr = 0.000
     Total         459         55         514 
                                             
         Y         317         14         331 
         N         142         41         183 
                                             
  Redlined           0          1       Total
             Persistent High Value
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